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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines REMIC regulations and Pooling and Servicing Agreements in an effort to ascertain 
if either the REMIC regulations or standard Pooling and Servicing Agreements are unnecessarily 
restrictive in the context of maximizing the profitability and minimizing losses associated with CMBS 
workouts, with particular attention given to the current real estate climate. The paper begins with a brief 
history of REMICs and moves on to an examination of the statutory requirements governing the creation 
and maintenance of REMIC status. Next, an examination of standard Pooling and Servicing Agreements 
is performed followed by attempts to identify weaknesses in REMIC regulations, which are illustrated by 
hypothetical examples. Potential modifications to REMIC regulations are divided into two categories: 
Preemptive Default and Actual Default. The paper concludes that, excepting for the discretionary short 
term allowance of balloon payment extensions, preemptive default modifications are unwarranted and 
impractical. However, the author also draws the conclusion that improvements to PSA‟s might be met 
through better integration of master and special servicers in certain scenarios and that REMIC regulations 
might be improved by allowing for certain material changes to collateral as well as carve outs in default 
scenarios as well as short run stop gap measures including REO Debt lending and an increase to the 
allowable length of the REO hold period. 
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Introduction, Relevance, and Overview 
As legions of toxic securities begin to reach maturity tensions between CMBS bondholders, 
borrowers and special servicers will continue to mount.  With the recent implementation of the 
Housing Affordable Modification Program designed to ease restrictions on loan modifications 
for Real Estate Mortgage Backed Securities backed by single family real estate assets, the 
commercial real estate industry is abuzz with talk of the need for similar modifications for 
commercial real estate. To date, numerous advocacy groups have written white papers and 
released statements asserting that Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMIC‟s) are 
significantly handicapped by existing REMIC legislation, relative to whole loan lenders, in their 
ability to modify the terms of a given loan within a securitized pool leading to unnecessary and 
otherwise avoidable losses for both borrowers and bondholders. The purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate these claims and ascertain if, how, and to what extent REMIC regulations and boiler 
plate Pooling and Servicing Agreements do hinder optimal returns for CMBS bondholders when 
qualified mortgages enter default.  
 
To this end, we will begin by briefly examining the history of REMICs followed by an outline of 
their structure and legal qualifications. Next, we will examine standard Pooling and Servicing 
Agreements and draw conclusions regarding their potential to unnecessarily limit bondholder 
returns.  Finally, we will examine draw similar conclusions regarding REMIC regulations and 
their limitations on both preemptive modification and modification during an actual default.  
 
The topic at hand is one that explores the marriage between finance and policy as is pertinent to 
CMBS and is, rather obviously, highly relevant in its own way to the current mortgage crisis. 
Given the severity of the current real estate downturn and this study‟s relative positioning at the 
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forefront of what will, unfortunately, be a rising quagmire of CMBS defaults, it is the author‟s 
sincere and humble hope that the conclusions drawn in this paper will help play a small role in 
the ongoing debate regarding best practices in the current market environment while 
simultaneously making a modest, but relevant, contribution to the body of work necessary to 
adapt, improve, or affirm prevailing REMIC policy and Pooling and Servicing Agreements in 
both the long and short run.  
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Chapter 1:  History and Purpose of Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits 
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, commonly referred to as REMICs, are securities 
primarily comprised of dozens and even hundreds of mortgages which are agglomerated into a 
single “pool” of mortgages, whose aggregate expected cash flow is sold as bonds backed by the 
expected cash flow of the principle and interest mortgage payments as well as the value of the 
real property itself.  
The focus of this treatise will be Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS), which, in 
the modern era, are nearly always qualified as REMICs. CMBS are essentially bonds that 
provide cash flow to investors from mortgages which utilize commercial properties as their 
collateral. This cash flow is prioritized into various tranches, which are separated by a sequential 
order of payment and are each rated individually by various rating agencies and assigned a return 
commensurate with that rating. For example, an AAA rated tranche will offer less risk and a 
lower rate of return than an AA rated tranche because the AAA will be paid in full first in the 
event of a cash shortfall.
1
 Thus, the risk profile for the bondholders is contingent on their priority 
in the payout structure, which is almost always a recoupment by position, otherwise known as 
sequential pay classes or a waterfall structure, as opposed to pari passu, with the AA rated 
tranche being fully subordinate to the AAA rated tranche and the A rated tranche being fully 
subordinate to the AA rated tranche and so on. 
2
 
Nearly all CMBS are structured under REMIC regulations, which were created with the intention 
of eliminating taxation at the entity level so as to avoid double taxation of the bondholders. In 
order to prevent the abuse of this tax relief, rigid guidelines govern the formation and 
maintenance of REMICs with severe fiscal consequences for their violation. With a few notable 
                                                          
1 Typically caused by a default of one of the many mortgages that produce the cash flow for the CMBS pool 
2 Or otherwise known as “pro rata” 
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exceptions, REMICS are designed to be static securities with minimal change to their underlying 
assets. This inflexibility is intended to prevent abuse of the tax preferred status of REMICs as 
well as to provide bondholders with a reasonable measure of certainty regarding the underlying 
assets backing the stream of cash f lows they are purchasing.  
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities allow for enhanced profits and increased liquidity and 
thus improve the depth of reach of the capital markets. Additionally, they act as a buffer against 
rising interest rates and help to maintain healthy credit levels. Aside from those advantages 
offered to securitizers and lenders, CMBS offer the advantage of being an alternative asset with 
historically low default rates
3
 and a significant yield premium over comparable term treasuries to 
bondholders. 
 
Background 
In 1968 Ginnie Mae issued the first Mortgage Backed Security using a pool of government-
ensured home loans as well as the first Mortgage Backed Security using a pool of conventional 
mortgages as collateral. Left to follow suit, Freddie Mac issued its own version of a pass-through 
security, dubbed a Participation Certificate, soon after. 
Nearly a decade later, 1977 saw the private sector begin to enter the real estate mortgage backed 
security arena as Bank of America issued the first whole-loan pass-through security. Whole loan 
pass through securities were comprised of credit worthy loans that exceeded the conforming loan 
size limitations set forth by Fannie Mae and were thus designated as jumbo loans.  
                                                          
3 Or at least this was the common point of view until the summer of 2007 
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In 1983 the GSE‟s were first to issue a new security product known as a collateralized mortgage 
obligation, which was sold by Freddie Mac and backed by individual whole loan mortgages as 
well as mortgage pass-through securities.
4
 One drawback to these CMO‟s was that investor 
profits were diluted by double taxation.
5Furthermore, these straightforward CMO‟s still exposed 
investors to prepayment risk. In response to concerns over prepayment risk, CMO‟s began to 
separate the core of their cash flows by distinguishing between Principle Only (PO) and Interest 
Only (IO) strips, which allows bondholders to trade on prepayment risk as the PO and IO strips 
react to interest rate fluctuations with opposite duration effects. Do note that although very 
similar, the qualifying difference between a CMO and REMIC is that a CMO consists of a sale 
of debt backed by mortgage assets where as a REMIC constitutes a sale of assets
6
.  
In 1982 the Regan administration passed new tax laws allowing for significant depreciation 
increases for the owners of commercial real estate, which in turn fueled a dramatic conversion of 
capital into physical real estate by investors eager to escape the high income taxes of this period.
7
 
1984 saw further developments in the innovation of mortgage backed securities wherein the 
underlying assets of the security instrument were Adjustable Rate Mortgages. Later that same 
year Fannie Mae began to issue pass-through mortgage backed securities whose underlying 
assets were multifamily mortgages and the pattern of offering new sources of cash flow 
continued. According to Laurence Taff, the impetus for the impending innovations that began in 
1984 within the mortgage securities market was the dramatic fall in mortgage interest rates 
during the early part of 1983 and the consequent market exposure to the negative convexity
8
 of 
                                                          
4Taff, Investing in Mortgage Securities, pg 168,  
5 Double Taxation refers to profits being taxed at both the entity level and then again at the individual level 
6 Note that CMO‟s are also bound by a different subset of regulations, which are outside the scope of this thesis 
7 Geltner and Miller, Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investment, pg 143 
8 Typically, bonds to rise in value as interests decline because they return a higher interest rate than the market. Negative convexity occurs when 
bonds decrease in value as interest rates fall. In the case of MBS, this is because borrowers will likely refinance their loan and prepay the 
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mortgage debt.
9
 In order to continue attracting investors, the market responded by creating these 
more versatile offerings to improve upon the simple pass through interest model by offering 
securities with inherently different risk profiles.  
 
In 1986, congress passed the now legendary1986 Tax Reform Act (1986 TRA) which, among 
other dramatic revisions, significantly reduced the earlier depreciation based tax advantages 
granted to commercial real estate by the Reagan administration. However, the 1986 TRA did 
allow for the creation of the trust vehicle known as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit 
(REMIC).
10
 As previously noted, the hallmark of the REMIC structure was its elimination of 
double taxation. REMICS immediately employed subordinate class structures via tranche 
separated waterfall payouts, which helped increase the appeal of real estate mortgage backed 
securities to investors by effectively redistributing prepayment risk and reward to those investors 
with a higher risk tolerance. Similarly, issuers were now able to provide a low risk tranche that 
was desirable to risk averse investors with strong preferences for stable cash flow. 
Concordantly, in 1986 Fannie Mae introduced the first Stripped Mortgage Backed Security 
(SMBS).
11
 Stripped mortgage backed securities are mortgage backed security instruments that 
have been broken into two functional components: Interest Only and Principle Only stripped 
securities. The interest only security is a bond that is backed by the interest component of various 
property owner‟s mortgage payments whereas the principle only stripped mortgage backed 
component is backed by the principle repayment portion of a mortgage obligation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
principle back sooner than anticipated, leaving the bondholder to reinvest the principle in a climate that now offers lower interest rates and thus 
lower yields than their original MBS investment 
9Taff, Investing in Mortgage Securities, pg 168,  
10 Geltner and Miller, Commercial Real Estate Investment and Analysis, pg143 
11 Taff, Investing in Mortgage Securities, pg 168 
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This period also saw the implementation of new varieties of REMIC securities. Floating Rate 
classes of REMICS made their debut in late 1986
12
 and in 1987 the first Planned Amortization 
Class (PAC) REMIC was introduced
13
 According to Fannie Mae:  
PACs are designed to produce more stable cash flow by directing prepayments from the 
underlying mortgage-related collateral to other classes, called companion or support classes. 
The PAC investor is scheduled to receive fixed principal payments (the PAC "schedule") over 
a predetermined period of time (the PAC "window") through a range of prepayment scenarios 
(the PAC "band"). The schedule will be met only if the underlying mortgage-related collateral 
prepays at a constant rate within the range assumed for the structuring of the PAC. The initial 
or "stated" PAC band, principal payment schedule, and PAC window are set out in the 
prospectus or prospectus supplement.  
 
Cash flow variability from changes in the prepayment speed of the underlying mortgage-
related collateral is distributed among other classes, but it is not eliminated from the 
underlying mortgage-related collateral as a whole. The integrity of the PAC schedule is 
directly influenced by the amount and structure of the support classes, so it is essential to 
understand the nature of the support classes in a particular transaction when evaluating a PAC.  
 
 While the REMIC innovation created by congress via the the Tax Reform Act offered new 
incentives for investing in commercial real estate securities, much of the recent real estate 
investment was based on a desire to generate a tax loss and increase the property owners 
aggregate tax savings rather than the explicit desire to generate profit. Thus, the market still 
favored direct asset ownership. This perverse incentive structure helped to inflate the values of 
real assets that might otherwise falter. It was in this manner that the Reagan depreciation 
expenses helped lead the way to a general overvaluation of real estate spurned forth by 
overinvestment. Eventually, the combination of the erosion of property level tax benefits and 
poor market fundamentals led to a sharp pullback in real estate investment in the late 1980‟s and 
commercial real estate quickly entered into decline, which was among the fundamental causes of 
                                                          
12Taff, Investing in Mortgage Securities, pg 171 
13Taff, Investing in Mortgage Securities, pg 171 
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the now infamous Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis.
14
 Concordantly, congress passed the Financial 
Institutions Recovery, Reform, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 in an attempt to bail out 
the largely insolvent Savings and Loan Industry, which bore the brunt of losses associated with 
the domestic real estate decline post 1986. In reaction to this, FIRREA setup the Resolution 
Trust Corporation (RTC) which was tasked with the purchasing and subsequent selling of the 
underperforming loans underwritten by the various savings and loan corporations. In an effort to 
improve regulation, FIRREA imposed risk-adjusted capital requirements on financial institutions, 
which offered increased incentives for the holding securitized debt as opposed to loans held on 
balance sheet, known as “whole loans”. These new capital requirements helped to fuel the 
dramatic increase in CMBS. 
In 1991, further modifications were made and the Tax Reform Act of the same year provided 
that an entity could only issue multi-class mortgage backed securities if it held REMIC status. 
This new legislation also established an entity known as a Taxable Mortgage Pool and was 
written in such a manner as to prompt any new mortgage backed security issues to choose 
between REMIC or TMP status as part of an either or proposition. TMP guidelines imposed an 
entity level tax that could only avoided by opting for REMIC status:  
Congress decided in 1986 that any entity formed after 1991 that offered real-estate 
mortgage debt-backed securities with two or more maturities and that did not elect 
REMIC status was to be taxed as a corporation and would not be eligible to join in filing 
a consolidated return. Under Sec. 7701(i), a TMP is an entity - "substantially all" of 
whose assets are debt obligations (or interests therein), more than 50% of which are real 
estate mortgages (or interests therein); - that is the obligor under debt obligations with 
two or more maturity dates (or with the same maturity but different rights relating to 
acceleration of maturity); and - whose payments on the debt obligations are required (or 
are arranged) to bear a relationship to payments on the underlying debt-obligation 
assets.
15
  
                                                          
14 745 banks failed during the S&L crisis, in part as a result of overextension and the devaluation associated with real estate. The real estate 
overinvestment was largely a result of the Reagan tax policies and its subsequent devaluation was largely a result of the Tax Reform act of 1986. 
15 Culb, The Tax Advisor, Monday, June 1, 1992 
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The purpose of this legislation seems to have been to offer external incentive for securitizers to 
utilize the REMIC legal structure as the only alternative, TMP classification, has severe impacts 
on the profitability of the security. It is then no surprise that the utilization of REMIC 
classification has dominated the mortgage backed securities market to present day.    
 
Despite the downturn of real estate in the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s, market stability 
eventually returned and an unprecedented real estate recovery was led by the long economic 
boom of the mid to late1990‟s. A mild slow down occurred in 1998, but the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble in 2001  increased real estate investment as the tangible assets of real estate 
came into fashion after the crash of the more ephemeral dot.com firms.
16
  
 
Real Estate investment continued to soar well into the mid 2000‟s with capitalization rates17 
reaching all time lows. Property values reached all time highs during this period, primarily as a 
result of a strong economy, sustained investment, and increasing rents in conjunction with the 
aforementioned historically low cap rates.
18
 The stellar performance of this period led to an 
irrational exuberance that, combined with aggressive prime rate cuts, excess global liquidity and 
ever decreasing lending standards,
19
  created a tidal wave of real estate investment. A housing 
bubble, largely based on single family speculation and inflated demand, ensued and continued to 
grow until the summer of 2007, when it unceremoniously burst.  The bursting bubble was led by 
subprime mortgages backed by single family residences wherein the determination was made 
                                                          
16 Geltner and Miller, Commercial Real Estate Investment and Analysis, pg. 144 
17 A Capitalization Rate, or Cap Rate, is the unlevered return on an asset as calculated by dividing the property‟s first year Net Operating Income 
by the purchase price. Cap Rates can be thought of, in part, as a measure of perceived riskiness for a property by comparing cap rates to the risk 
free rate.  
18
 Geltner and Miller, Commercial Real Estate Investment and Analysis, pg. 145 
19 Such as lower Loan to Value and Income/Debt Service Coverage Requirements as well the proliferation of exotic products such as negative 5 
and 10 year interest only loans and 5 year option arms with negative amortization payments.  
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that the various tranches carried higher levels of risk than first thought. This led to the re-rating 
and re-pricing of the instruments, which effectively priced the securities at a loss for the issuers, 
which had insufficient capital to cover these losses. Further deterioration of property 
fundamentals ensued and confidence continued to wane in the rating agencies ability to 
effectively estimate the risk associated with the various mortgage backed securities (MBS). Once 
the inability to effectively predict the risk associated with the securities became widespread, 
investors lost the ability to determine the appropriate risk premium
20
 for MBS and they became 
toxic securities. This lack of confidence in risk metrics soon spilled over into CMBS and all of 
the primary securitizers either became insolvent or voluntarily ceased their MBS operations.  
  
                                                          
20 A risk premium is the amount of interest offered for an investment above the current risk free rate 
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Chapter 2:  REMIC Role Distinctions 
REMICs are host to several distinct parties, each with their own incentives, risks, and function 
within the modern REMIC structure. This section is intended to provide a primer on the various 
roles and functions within a REMIC in order to allow the reader to better familiarize herself with 
primary parties involved with the creation and management of REMICs. Figure RD-1 identifies 
and illustrates the basic function of these parties.
21
 
 
Figure RD-122 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 This section was strongly influenced by the excellent work done in Laurence G Taff’s book, Mortgage Securities 
22Largely derived from a similar untitled model created by Washington Mutual Bank 
18 | P a g e  
 
The Issuer 
Commercial mortgage backed securities allow issuers to convert otherwise relatively illiquid 
assets into liquid, off balance sheet, tradable instruments. This has the added value of allowing 
banks to trade actively while maintaining federally mandated capital ratio requirements. CMBS 
also allows investment and portfolio managers to better manage risk by allowing them to buy 
and sell specific investor classes and to hedge their bets through the use of mortgage swaps. 
However, there are additional benefits to issuers including a lower cost of capital, greater 
diversification through funding sources, more efficient use of capital and enhanced financial 
performance. Finally, by moving the loans off balance sheet and passing the cash flow through to 
the certificate holder, the issuer effectively passes default risk on to the bondholder. Issuers are 
primarily investment banks and, to a lesser extent, life insurance companies.   
 
However, as recent events have poignantly indicated, CMBS issuers do not issue securitizations 
without a certain measure of risk.
 23
  Specifically, these risks are known as Interest Rate Risk and 
Product Risk.  
 
Interest rate risk is a fundamental risk to which no fixed-income instrument is immune. As 
market interest rates fluctuate, so too does the price of a given fixed-income security. This price 
fluctuates in an inverse manner such that if interest rates rise, the price of the security falls. 
Because CMBS pools are formed from individual loans that each take time to close and originate, 
an aggregate mispricing can also occur as market rates fluctuate over the course of the time lag 
that exists between the oldest and newest mortgages within the pool prior to the securitization 
date, effectively lowering the aggregate interest rate and diluting the issuers profits.  
                                                          
23 i.e. The collapse of many notable investment banks, such as Lehman Brothers, as a result of holding toxic CMBS and RMBS 
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Product risk is a less common risk wherein certain concessions or structures may be necessary to 
complete a specific loan transaction which renders the loan less liquid because of its nonstandard 
nature. This risk is often the result of the tensions between originators who must compete to offer 
competitive deal structures to borrowers and securitizers, who sell the security instruments to a 
largely risk averse clientele that prefer standard “vanilla” transactions.  
 
The Bondholders 
The CMBS mechanism provides liquidity for bondholders who may wish to invest in real estate 
without acquiring the illiquidity associated with direct investment. CMBS also offers 
bondholders an explicit diversification factor via the mixture of product type, geography, and 
asset class that is aggregated within any given pool. The CMBS structure also allows the 
borrower a measurable degree of control over the risk and return profile they wish to gain 
exposure to through the availability of a large variety of yield diverse tranches within the 
mortgage pool. Furthermore, a wide variety of retail products exist spread across multiple 
expected return horizons offering a further degree of diversification. Finally, AAA rated CMBS 
offer a historically low default rate of less than 1 percent with a return typically 50 – 100 bps24 
over comparable term treasuries.
 25
 
 
The Borrowers 
CMBS borrowers are typically developers seeking to “take out” their construction financing or 
property owners looking to acquire or refinance asset level debt. The primary advantage of 
                                                          
24 Morgan Stanley Fixed Rate AAA 10 year Treasuries CMBS Spread Historical Chart 
25 Costar CMBS report, June 11th, 2008 
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CMBS based financing for borrowers is the reduced cost of capital via mortgages with lower 
interest rates relative to traditional portfolio lenders and life insurance companies, which tend to 
hold whole loans on their portfolio. The higher interest rate for whole loan lenders relative to 
securitized loans is the natural effect of retaining the default risk of their loans by holding them 
on their balance sheets. By contrast, CMBS issuers pass this risk on to the bondholders, hence 
their slightly lower interest rates.  
 
Conversely, the primary disadvantage of borrowing through the CMBS mechanism is the lack of 
flexibility endemic to securitized transactions. While a portfolio lender may be willing to make 
mutually beneficial adjustments to the term, rate, or conditions of a mortgage obligation at some 
period after the mortgage has signed, the static nature of a REMIC prohibits such changes except 
in the case of actual, technical, or reasonably foreseeable default and even in this instances the 
limitations for modification can still be unwieldy.
 26
  Additionally, borrowers typically agree to 
lock-out periods and methods for the defeasement of existing loans in lieu of prepayment. Thus, 
borrowers that wish to refinance their loan early due to a favorable change in market interest 
rates must typically engage the defeasement process in order to refinance their existing loan or 
sell their property ahead of schedule.  
 
Defeasement is a substitution of collateral performed by exchanging the expected cash flow from 
the borrower‟s existing loan for an equal cash flow derived from a portfolio of US securities with 
a maturity date equal to the remaining term of the borrower‟s original loan obligation.27 The 
substitution security is usually paid for out of proceeds from the refinance. The obligation to 
                                                          
26 See the later discussion in this paper for more details on the static requirements of REMICs 
27 This is required by REMIC regulations, again, see the later discussion on REMIC qualifications and maintenance for more detail 
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finance the replacement of the mortgage security decreases the potential savings for a borrower 
and raises the “in the money” interest rate threshold for refinance savings due to the additional 
costs of defeasance. Thus, an important drawback for CMBS loans is the additional limitations 
imposed on the borrower‟s ability to capitalize on favorable interest rate adjustments due to 
defeasance costs that is often not present with a traditional portfolio lender.  
 
The Trustees 
The Bondholder Trustee acts on behalf of the bondholders in relaying information between the 
bondholders and the master servicer. In the event of a default and subsequent modification, loan 
sale, REO disposition, the Trustee will also ensure that the required fair value determination is 
accurate and that the special servicer‟s recommended course of action is in the best interest of the 
bondholders. The Owner Trustee acts as the administrator of the trust and pays any associated 
expenses.  
 
The Master Servicer 
The Master Servicer may be, rather simply, thought of as the general manager of the REMIC 
once the mortgages have been acquired, securitized, and sold to bond holders by the issuer. A 
master servicer‟s primary responsibility is the collection and distribution of the principle and 
interest income. In short, the master servicer effectively serves as the bridge between the 
borrowers and bondholders for which payment distributions “pass through”28. Their primary 
responsibilities are reporting to the trust and general oversight. Reports are complied and sent to 
the trustee on the remittance date mandated by the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). In 
order to ensure a continuity of cash flows, master servicers will typically be required to advance 
                                                          
28 Although, technically, the funds will be passed through to the trustee for deposit and may also be collected by a sub-servicer 
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scheduled payments to the bond certificate holders and as such convention requires that they 
maintain a credit rating equal to the second highest tranche within the REMIC they are servicing. 
By advancing payments, master servicers ensure the uninterrupted and timely payment of 
interest to the certificate holders.   
 
Master servicers have little to no discretionary power and are tightly bound by the Pooling and 
Servicing Agreement, which contains the principle REMIC provisions that apply to the Master 
Servicer.
29
 Master Servicers are compensated via a fixed basis point spread, typically 5bps, on 
the aggregate size of the loan pool.
 30
  Master servicers can also earn income on the float 
associated with principle, interest, and tax payments as well as through late fees associated with 
the accounts. Float income is generated by investing the payments received by borrowers in very 
short term instruments during in the interim between receipt of the payment and the dispersion of 
funds.  
 
Because of the inherent inflexibility in the REMIC regulations and their direct liability for 
maintenance of the preferred REMIC tax treatment, master servicers can be expected to rigidly 
follow the provisions agreed upon within the governing Pooling and Servicing Agreement. Do 
note that while master servicers retain some level of responsibility for analyzing pertinent market 
trends and tracking notable data points within the REMIC, including the generation of watch lists 
for loans meeting certain quantitative criteria that are indicative of potential future default,
31
 the 
practical reality of their low margin/high volume compensation and relatively limited human 
capital is that master servicers have powerful incentives to always follow the letter of the law. 
                                                          
29 The Master Servicer is held accountable by the bondholders and the Trustee 
30 Information provided by Wells Fargo 
31 Such as rapidly declining NOI or the unexpected loss of a major tenant 
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Some of the typical provisions governing Master Servicers include furnishing all necessary 
information to the trustee, payment of prohibited transaction taxes
32
, management of foreclosure 
property, and general compliance with REMIC regulations. A more detailed listing may be found 
in Appendix A-1:
33
 
 
 
In general, a breach by the master  servicer of any of the relevant REMIC provisions will result 
in either a loss of the REMIC‟s status and a subsequent reversion to TMP status or the 
imposition of severe taxes on the REMIC, which would then  be the financial responsibility of 
the servicer, which is a substantial risk depending on the severity of such a breach and the results 
thereof. For this reason in part, master servicers are usually required via the PSA to hold a high 
credit ratings. Most significant within this agglomeration of provisions is the tension between the 
No Modifications clause, wherein the master servicer agrees to ensure that no modification , 
waiver, or amendment shall be allowed which will allow the REMIC to lose its status as a pass 
through entity and the No Disposition of Assets clause, the latter of which allows for the 
disposition of assets during “default, imminent default or foreclosure of a mortgage loan, 
including but not limited to properties acquired or sold by deed in lieu of foreclosure”. 
 
The Sub-Servicer 
While it is by no means a universal practice, often times master servicers will outsource certain 
functions to a secondary servicer, known as a sub-servicer. In this arrangement, the sub-servicer 
will typically take over the role as primary borrower contact and will perform the most basic 
                                                          
32 This responsibility serves as a substantial incentive for the master servicer never to violate REMIC regulations because these taxes are paid out 
of pocket by the master servicer. 
33 Vescovacci,, Servicing Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits in U.S. Mortgage Securitizations 
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services, such as: billing and payment collection, account monitoring, scheduled interest rate 
adjustments, basic property inspection, and general customer service. 
 
While master servicers are sometimes financially motivated to outsource certain activities to sub-
servicers, this is not the sole reason for their existence. The individual loans that comprise a 
CMBS issue are often originated by many different mortgage brokers and boutique investment 
banks. These firms are highly incentivized to retain contact with their books of business and will 
frequently offer subservicing through specialized divisions of their firm as a marketing tool that 
allows originators to present themselves as providing borrowers with a holistic service package 
that allows them a single point of contact for the life of the loan. Furthermore, mortgage brokers 
also gain the competitive advantage of receiving early notification when a borrower considers 
defeasing an existing loan. This allows them to contact their borrower before they potentially 
seek out an alternative source of capital, creating unwanted competition that is likely to detract 
from the brokerages profits. Finally, subservicing offers fee based origination firms an 
opportunity for a stable cash flow value add through the 5 – 10 bps typically associated with 
subservicing. As a result, there are often numerous sub-servicers associated with the single 
master servicer that will govern the administration of any given REMIC.  
 
The Special Servicer  
In the event of a delinquency, default, or reasonably foreseeable default the special servicer is 
responsible for ensuring that a given loan returns to performing status. A special servicer‟s 
fiduciary duty lies with the bondholder and not the borrower, so the special servicer has a moral 
obligation to consider the returns to the pool‟s certificate holders as they work to find cures for 
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defaults. Furthermore, the special servicer should consider the best interests of certificate holders 
within various tranches equally, with no special consideration given to superior or subordinated 
classes. Typically, special servicers will attempt to resolve a default via loan modification, loan 
sale or foreclosure. Special servicers traditionally receive 25 – 50 basis points based on the loan 
volume that enters special servicing as well as bonus fees for an REO or loan sale of or the 
successful modification of a loan in arrears.   
 
The Controlling Class 
The controlling class is defined as the most subordinate class possessing a remaining certificate 
balance equal to at least 25% of the initial principal balance of such class. Presumably, this 
language is intended to account for the elimination of tranches in the event of credit support loss. 
This controlling class is afforded the right to designate a Controlling Class Representative (CCR) 
which makes recommendations to the special servicer as to how to best cure a given default on 
behalf of the controlling class. The controlling class also has the right to receive Asset Status 
Reports from the special servicer, which provide updates on the current performance and market 
data pertinent to any troubled assets in the mortgage pool.  
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Chapter 3: Qualifications for REMIC Status 
REMICs are governed by a strict set of qualifying guidelines, which are primarily enforced by 
the IRS. In order to engage the potential limitations of these requirements as is our purpose, it is 
first prudent to provide an overview of the salient regulations in their current form. These 
regulations set forth the basic legal requirements for a security to qualify for REMIC status. 
 
The basic qualifications for REMIC status are as follows:
34
 
 
1. It has elected to be a REMIC for the year it was organized and all subsequent years 
through the current year. 
2. It is wholly owned by holders of regular and residual interests. 
3. It has only one class of residual interests. 
4. All distributions to holders of residual interests must be pro rata. 
5. Substantially all of its assets are “qualified mortgages and permitted investments” at 
the close of the third month beginning after the startup day and at all times thereafter. 
6. It uses the calendar year as its taxable year. 
7. It makes “reasonable arrangements” to ensure that residual interests are not held by a 
“disqualified organization” (i.e., the government, a governmental agency, or a tax-exempt 
organization that is not subject to the unrelated business income tax (UBIT)). 
8. It makes “reasonable arrangements” to make “available…information necessary for the 
application of” a tax on transfers of residual interests to disqualified organizations. 35 
 
                                                          
34 Reg. § 1.860D-1(c) 
35 § 860D(a) . See IRC § 860E(e)(5) (defining “disqualified organization”) 
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Because the depth and breadth of the rules governing REMICS, many industry professionals 
cognitively simplify the regulations governing REMICS into two, more practical tests of 
qualification: First, The Asset Test, which seeks to ensure that only permitted assets are used as 
collateral to secure the cash flow due the bondholders, and second, the Interest Test
36
, which 
seeks to reconcile the type and distribution of profits for the mortgage pool into numerous 
regular interest classes as well as a single residual interest class.   
 
The Asset Test 
The fundamental intent of the asset test it to determine whether or not a given REMIC's assets 
are comprised of either qualified mortgages or permitted investments as governed by IRS 
Revenue Procedures. To satisfy this requirement, a REMIC may not hold more than a de 
minimis
37
 amount of assets other than qualified mortgages or a select few assets deemed to be 
permitted.
38
 It is worth noting that the majority of REMICs are comprised almost exclusively of 
qualified mortgages.  
 
Asset Test - Qualified Mortgages
39
 
The definition of a qualified mortgage is vague enough to allow for REMICs to include nearly 
any debt obligation utilizing real property as collateral so long as it is secured within three 
months of the REMIC startup. Examples of the aforementioned obligations include deeds of trust, 
installment land contracts, and mortgages. For the purposes of a REMIC “real property” mirrors 
the definitions that govern REITS, under which land and its improvements are considered real 
property. “Interests” in said real property include fee ownership, co-ownership, or options to 
                                                          
36 Which refers to the bondholders claims in general and should not be confused as interest being paid by borrowers on the underlying assets, 
37 Assets are considered de minimis if they account for less than one percent of the adjusted basis of all of a REMIC's assets 
38   Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(i) . 
39  B&L Chapter 58.3.2, REMICS 
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acquire land or leaseholds of land or improvements thereon.
40
 A qualified mortgage can also 
include interest in another REMIC or Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT), 
so long as 95% of the FASIT assts would meet the conditions of a REMIC qualified mortgage.  
Note that various credit enhancement techniques, such as excess spread or overcollateralization, 
are viewed as part of the mortgage and not as a separate instrument. A detailed definition of a 
qualified mortgage can be found in Appendix A-2. 
 
Asset Test - Permitted Investments 
As previously mentioned, although qualified mortgages constitute the majority of REMIC assets, 
additional allowable profits can be taken from assets which are deemed, “Permitted Investments.” 
These investments are comprised of one of three primary categories: Cash Flow Investments, 
Qualified Reserve Assets, and Foreclosure Property. 
41
 
 
Cash Flow Investments 
A cash flow investment is defined as, “a temporary investment of amounts received under 
qualified mortgages, pending distribution of these amounts to holders of interests in the REMIC.” 
Cash flow investments typically take the form of short term investments in passive assets that 
earn interest, such as high yield money market accounts. This type of investment often takes 
place in the time between receipt of a mortgage payment and the distribution of funds and this 
temporary period may not exceed thirteen months. As the custodians of the cash flow, both 
master servicers and sub-servicers will frequently utilize this technique to provide a boost to their 
expected compensation.
42
 Examples of qualifying payments include mortgage payments, 
                                                          
40 Fabozzi and Jacon, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities  
41 B&L Chapter 58.3.2 REMICS 
42 For more information on servicers please see the Master Servicer section in REMIC Role Distinctions 
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principal or interest, payments on credit enhancement contracts, profits from disposing of 
mortgages, funds from foreclosure properties, payments for warranty breaches on mortgages, and 
prepayment penalties.
43
 
 
Qualified Reserve Assets and Funds 
A qualified reserve asset is, “intangible property held for investment and as part of a „qualified 
reserve fund‟” while a qualified reserve fund is defined as a “reasonably required reserve” for the 
payment of expenses of the REMIC and “amounts due on regular interests in the event of 
defaults on qualified mortgages or lower than expected returns on cash flow investments.” These 
reserve funds are a form of credit enhancement often maintained by the master or sub-servicer in 
the event of a shortfall.  
 
Foreclosure Property 
 
Foreclosure property is real property and incidental personal property that is acquired by the 
REMIC as the result of default or the reasonably foreseeable default of a mortgage within the 
mortgage pool. The REMIC may only hold foreclosed property for three years
44
 A REMIC is 
taxed at 35 percent on the net income from the disposition of foreclosure property.  
 
The Interest Test 
The second basic test a REMIC must pass is the Interest Test. Every REMIC is comprised of 
multiple regular interests and a singular residual interest.  
 
The Interest Test - Regular Interests 
                                                          
43 Peasle and Nirenberg, ,Federal Income Taxation of Securitization Transactions 
44 According to David Iannarone, director of Special Servicing at CW Asset Management, the IRS will almost always grant an additional three 
year extension to this initial three year hold period.  
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The Regular Interest component of the REMIC is the “pass through” component that is the heart 
of the REMIC structure. It is comprised of the principle and interest payments which are made 
by the borrower and passed through directly to the bondholder by the master servicer. The 
regular interests comprise the components of the mortgage pool that are carved into various 
tranches, which are the hallmark of the CMBS structure. A regular interest is an interest in a 
REMIC that is issued on the REMIC's startup day; has “fixed terms”; is designated as a regular 
interest; and “unconditionally entitles the holder to receive a specified principal amount or other 
similar amount.” 
 
As they pertain to a REMIC, the IRS defines a regular interest as one that: 
 
1. Must  generally entitle the holder to a principal amount and is treated for federal tax 
purposes as a debt instrument. 
 
2. I is treated as a debt instrument for all federal income tax purposes, regardless of its form, 
including the determination of the taxable incomes of both the holder and the REMIC.
 45 
 
3. Is an interest bearing interest that is “disproportionately high relative to the principal 
amount” can qualify as a regular interest only if it consists of an entitlement to a specified 
portion of the interest payments on qualified mortgages
46
 
 
 
The Interest Test - Residual Interests 
A residual interest is an interest in a REMIC, “that is issued on the startup day, is not a regular 
interest, and is designated as a residual interest.”47A holder of a residual interest in a REMIC 
                                                          
45   IRC §§ 860B(a) , 860C(b)(1)(A) ; Reg. § 1.860G-1(b)(6) 
46   Reg. § 1.860G-1(b)(5) . Interest is considered disproportionately high if the issue price exceeds 125 percent of the principal amount. 
47    IRC § 860G(a)(2) ; Reg. § 1.860G-1(c) . A REMIC designates an interest as a residual interest in its initial income tax return on Form 1066. 
Reg. §§ 1.860D-1(d)(2) , 1.860G-1(c) . 
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must annually recognize ordinary income equal to its pro rata share of the REMIC's taxable 
income using the accrual method of accounting.
48
 
 
The residual interest, as its name would indicate, is an ownership interest in the residual assets of 
the REMIC which is almost universally held by the issuer. Residual interest classes typically 
earn income through a rate differential between the average weighted interest of the REMIC 
minus the servicing fees and the average weighted paid interest to the bondholders. This 
difference in interests is commonly referred to as the “juice” in the deal for the securitizer. 
Residual Interests may also earn income through overcollateralization. REMIC regulations are 
very rigid in that the REMIC must have one, and only one, residual interest class. 
  
                                                          
48 An accrual basis taxpayer receives income when (1) the required performance occurs, (2) payment therefore is due, or (3) payment therefore is 
made, whichever happens earliest. 
32 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 4:  REMIC Maintenance and Modification  
Just as the requisite qualifications for achieving REMIC status are rather stringent, so too are the 
rules and regulations governing the maintenance of said status.   
 
Permitted Loan Modifications 
The four types of loan modifications expressly permitted under section 1.860G-2(b) (3) are
49
: 
 
1. Changes in the terms of the obligation occasioned by default or a reasonably foreseeable 
default 
 
2. Assumption of the obligation 
 
3. Waiver of a due-on-sale clause or a due on encumbrance clause 
 
4. Conversion of an interest rate by a mortgagor pursuant to the terms of a convertible 
mortgage.  
 
All other modifications are prohibited, with the REMIC regulations specifically disallowing for 
the transferring of mortgage loans after the startup date and expressly forbidding any significant 
modifications except in connection with a default or reasonably foreseeable default. Specific 
details can be found in Appendix A-3 and A-4. 
 
The rules governing permitted loan modifications create a basis for wide ranging methods of 
modification under default and “reasonably foreseeable” default50 scenarios, while also 
establishing criteria for the very limited types of modifications that can occur in the absence of 
the aforementioned default scenarios. The natural result of this legislation is that the vast 
majority of modifications happen once the property is in actual or reasonably foreseeable duress. 
If a REMIC makes modifications to a qualified mortgage that are not permissible, such 
                                                          
49 Real Estate Round Table White Paper on REMIC Modification 
50 See the section on reasonably foreseeable default in this paper for more detail 
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modifications will be deemed “significant” and the profit from the event will be subject to a one 
hundred percent tax. Additionally, the REMIC would be in danger of losing its tax preferred 
status and could potentially revert from REMIC classification to that of TMP, an event that 
would be disastrous to bondholder returns due to the double taxation that accompanies TMP 
status.  
The saving grace for REMICs lies in their relatively flexible nature at default as most of the 
restrictions governing permitted modifications are lifted when a loan enters arrears. 
Concordantly, special servicers will engage in a myriad of reconciliatory measures once the 
default has occurred or is reasonably foreseeable. This flexibility was intended by the architects 
of the REMIC regulations so as to offer the bondholders a reasonable mechanism to engage in 
loss mitigation without compromising the inherently static nature of REMICS.   
 
Defeasance 
As capital needs and interest rates fluctuate, it is often times in the best interest of the borrower 
for a given loan within a REMIC pool to refinance their debt. Refinancing of the debt is usually 
permissible if the borrower agrees substitute the expected cash flow with equal term and value 
government security. Upon doing so, the REMIC may release their lien on the originally 
encumbered real property and subsequently qualify the new security instrument as a qualified 
mortgage. While defeasance is allowable under REMIC regulations it is not obligatory. However, 
it is usually a requirement of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement.  
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Qualified Liquidations 
REMICs typically terminate their existence through a plan of liquidation wherein the REMIC 
adopts a plan and then liquidates the entirety of its assets and distributes them to both the regular 
and residual interest holders. Both the liquidation and distribution must take places within ninety 
days of the establishment of the liquidation plan. 
51
 
 
  
                                                          
51 See Chapter 25 of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities by Fabozzi and Jacob 
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Chapter 5:  The CMBS Default Process 
Having delved into the background, function, parties, and legal qualifications for REMICs, we 
will now examine the modification process in greater detail. 
Default, in accordance with REMIC regulations, occurs when a given mortgage within the pool 
enters either actual or “reasonably foreseeable” default. Recall that virtually any substantive 
modifications to a loan in the absence of an actual or reasonably foreseeable default are 
expressly forbidden by REMIC regulations and would result in a loss of REMIC status. While 
REMIC regulations do not precisely define a default, it is standard industry practice to recognize 
a default scenario as the occurrence of one of the following:
52
  
1. A monthly payment is delinquent, usually for 60 days 
2. Determination by the Master Servicer that a payment or other material default is 
imminent and not likely to be cured within 60 days 
3. Decree or order of bankruptcy that has not been discharged or unstayed for a period of 60 
days 
4. Mortgagor consents to the appointment of a conservator or receiver 
5. Mortgagor admits in writing its inability to pay its debts as they become due 
6. There is a notice of foreclosure or proposed foreclosure  
7. Payment default at maturity 
Note that loans entering into technical default are usually cured by the master servicer and do not 
normatively move to the special servicer. Examples of technical default include assumptions or 
assignments without approval, insufficient insurance coverage, and other breaches of covenant. 
A more serious default measure, such as failure to maintain previously agreed upon debt service 
                                                          
52 Based on unnamed material provided by the Commercial Mortgage Servicing Association 
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coverage ratios will, minimally, place the property onto a watch list for continued review by the 
special servicer.  
Once the master servicer has determined that either an actual or reasonably foreseeable
53
 default 
has occurred the loan is sent to special servicing. In general, the special servicer has three cures 
for default: Workout Modifications, Loan Sale, and Foreclosure. While engaging these options, 
the preeminent concern of the special servicer is the preservation of REMIC status. Secondary to 
this concern is the desire to obtain maximum NPV for the bondholders while minimizing credit 
loss severity. In the course of these duties, the special servicer is expected to service and 
administer the mortgage loans in the best interests and for the benefit of the certificate holders as 
a collective whole in accordance with applicable law and the terms of the PSA and, to the extent 
consistent with the foregoing, in accordance with the following standards
54
: 
1. With the same care, skill, prudence and diligence as it services and administers 
comparable mortgage loans and manages real properties on behalf of third parties or on 
behalf of itself, whichever is the higher standard  
 
2. With a view to the maximization of recovery on such Mortgage Loan to the Certificate 
holders, as a collective whole, on a present value basis (the relevant discounting of 
anticipated collections to be performed at a rate determined by the Special Servicer but in 
no event less than the related Net Mortgage Rate) 
 
  
In an effort to clearly outline their fiduciary duty and to ameliorate potential agency problems, 
both the master servicer and the special servicer are required to act without regard to any 
relationship either party might have with a given mortgager or owner of a certificate. 
Furthermore, servicers are expected to remain objective in spite of their right to receive 
reimbursements as well as any obligations they may hold to repurchase a mortgage loan from the 
                                                          
53 PSA‟s will often refer to reasonably foreseeable default as “imminent default” but the terms are relatively interchangeable 
54 Unnamed material provided by the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association 
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trust as seller. The special servicer must also remain unmoved by the master servicer‟s 
obligations to make advances.   
In the event of a default, the controlling class representative will make every effort to ensure that 
all viable solutions for cure that maintain the integrity of the most subordinate remaining class 
are pursued. While this input is considered, and some PSA‟s have provisions allowing for the 
CCR to at least initially reject default cures, final authority ultimately rests with the Special 
Servicer.  
 
Workout Modifications 
Once a loan has entered default, the special servicer is given wide latitude by both the REMIC 
regulations and the PSA to make modifications to cure said default. For instance, the special 
servicer may agree to extend the maturity of the loan and defer or forgive interest, late payment 
charges, prepayment charges, and yield maintenance charges. As an incentive for positive 
reconciliatory measures, special servicers receive additional compensation in the form of fees 
that are earned for loans that remain performing (usually for a period of 3 or more months) after 
modification.  Note that changes to collateral, including additions, substitutions, and releases are 
not allowed under REMIC regulations regardless of the default designation of an asset, nor is the 
conversion of a single loan or loans secured by multiple properties into multiple loans each 
secured by a single property. In short, material changes to the collateral backing a qualified 
mortgage are generally prohibited in all circumstances.  
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Risks inherent to loan modification for bondholders include re-default risk and the risk of self-
cure. Re-default risk is the risk that borrower will re-enter default after a modification is 
performed, as the new terms of the loan become untenable due to further deterioration of 
property fundamentals or some other cause. Concern over re-default risk is especially 
exacerbated in economic climates where commercial real estate prices are falling and the special 
servicer runs the risk of merely delaying the inevitable default, only to foreclose on a property 
that has continued to decline in value in the time between the initial modification and second 
default. Another concern is the self-cure effect, wherein borrowers have some external means of 
cure through a preventative or ameliorating action, such as the paying down of principle or the 
posting of a letter of credit
55
but are unwittingly afforded the opportunity to utilize the 
modification process as an unnecessary means to receiving a discount on their loan. Thus, a 
borrower may aggressively negotiate an ameliorating change of terms for their mortgage 
obligation when they had the willingness and wherewithal to cure the default without concession 
from the special servicer. 
 
Loan Sale 
In a default scenario, it is customary for both the special servicer and the controlling class to be 
afforded an opportunity to purchase the loan from the trust, but the purchase must be at Fair 
Market Value (FMV). FMV is determined by any relevant information including appraisal, 
market conditions, and third party opinions. Usually, the PSA will insist that the FMV must be 
determined within 30 days of a completed appraisal. Loan sales typically occur in scenarios 
                                                          
55 A letter of credit demonstrates a specified sum held in reserve by a 3rd party, usually a bank, to be utilized by the debt holder in the event of an 
interest shortfall. It is, essentially, additional collateral. Note that a LOC is not deemed “significant” under REMIC regulations. 
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where it is desirable for the property to be disposed of quickly. For example, a special servicer 
may have an information advantage over potential buyers wherein the special servicer is aware 
of a certain externality that my lower the price of a property in arrears, and this knowledge will 
soon become public. In this case, the expedience of a loan sale (relative to that of a foreclosure) 
may be preferred. Note that, per usual, a loan sale will only be permitted if it is in the best 
interest of the bondholders.  
Foreclosure 
If there is no other viable alternative the special servicer will bring the loan to foreclosure 
proceedings in an attempt to sell the property to recoup as much principle balance and lost 
interest as possible. The special servicer bid on a foreclosed property they have listed, but is 
bound by the PSA to accept the highest bid. In cases where the special servicer bids on the 
property, they must receive at least two competing bids in order to determine FMV. The hold 
period for an REO is three years, though the IRS will almost always grant an additional three 
year extension upon request. Also note that REMICs cannot extend loans to potential purchasers, 
who may have difficulty acquiring capital to finance an underperforming property.  
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Chapter 6:  An Overview Pooling and Servicing Agreements 
The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) is the total summation of the contractual 
obligations between each of the parties involved in a given CMBS transaction.  Furthermore, the 
PSA serves to establish agreed upon procedures and governance in the event of any sort of 
occurrence that demands some sort of special action. Pooling and Servicing Agreements are 
complex documents that have evolved into a contract that is typically over 400 pages in length, 
and each PSA is unique to the transaction which it governs. However, over the course of their 
evolution a standardized format has developed, in which generalities of format and substance can 
be gleaned. Accordingly, Pooling and Servicing Agreements almost universally contain twelve 
basic Articles. Most pertinent for the purposes of this treatise is Article III. In an effort to 
demonstrate this fact, an outline of the general content of each of the twelve standard PSA 
articles has been outlined as follows:
56
  
 
Article I: Definitions 
This section provides an overview of key definitions within the PSA and primarily serves the 
function of clarification. Examples of such points of clarification include an explanation of terms 
an definitions relating to securities structures, class definitions, the transfer of assets, and what 
constitutes a material breach of contract. This section will also often include pertinent collection, 
remittance, and reporting dates. Typically, there is also an overview key terms relating to 
REMIC regulatory definitions and Regulation AB. A listing and description of the various 
tranches can often be found in this section as well.  
 
                                                          
56 This overview is largely based on review of several Pooling and Servicing Agreements as well as untitled material graciously made available 
by the Commercial Mortgage Securities Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association. 
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Article II: Conveyance 
Article II focuses on the creation of the Trust and spells out the Trustees duties. It does so by 
establishing the rules governing the conveyance of the mortgage loans into the trust fund. It 
specifies which documents must be delivered as part of the Mortgage File
57
, when they must be 
delivered, and the process for certifying deliver. Article II also describes defaults and potential 
remedies for wholesalers and secondary purchases who misrepresented their loans, or else have 
committed a breach of warranty. Finally, Article II usually spells out the corporate entity 
representations and warranties to the various parties of the PSA.  
 
Article III: Administration and Servicing 
This section of the PSA contains the blueprint for the normative ongoing activities of a given 
CMBS issue. It includes provisions relating to account administration such as collections, escrow, 
and reserve accounts as well as remittances and servicer reporting duties and obligations. This 
section also outlines the appropriate process for servicing advances, handling assignments and 
assumptions. Most importantly, Article III outlines the processes governing the Special 
Servicer‟s rights and obligations to manage REO‟s, foreclosure, and the liquidation process.  
 
Article IV: Payments to the Certificate Holders 
This section outlines the waterfall provisions that set forth the normative tranche distribution 
structure for CMBS issues. This section also contains provisions which instruct the Trustee on 
the appropriate principle, interest, and prepayment premium distributions for each class of 
                                                          
57 A Mortgage File is a collection of documents and instruments. Each loan in a given pool contains a mortgage file.  
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investors and contains provisions regarding Principle and Interest Advances from the master 
servicers as well as nonrecoverability
58
 determinations.  
 
Article V: Certificates 
Article IV contains the main provisions for the form of certificate, transfers, and restrictions on 
transfers of certificates and ERISA restrictions.
59
 
 
Article VI: Depositor, Master Servicer, & Special Servicer 
Article VI addresses the extent and limits of liability, indemnity, qualification and resignation of 
both the Master Servicer and Special Servicers. Typically, negligence (note: not gross negligence) 
is the liability and indemnity standard used to govern this section. This section will also usually 
lay down provisions wherein the master servicer agrees not to assign or transfer any rights and is 
also required to afford reasonable access to the depositor, NIMS Insurer and the Trustee access 
to all records. Herein is usually contained the language allowing for master servicers to assign 
certain activities to sub servicers.  
 
Article VII: Default 
This section contains provisions that define when the master, sub, and special servicers commit 
an act of default. Typically, this section assigns the assumption of the servicing role to the 
Trustee in the event of a servicer default. Typically, any breach will cause the termination of the 
master servicer‟s rights and obligations.  
 
                                                          
58
 A master servicer must continue to make to certificate holders until the funds have been deemed non-recoverable 
59 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) imposes certain fiduciary requirements on a person who manages the assets 
of an employee benefit plan. 
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Article VIII: Trustee, Custodian, & Tax Administrator 
Article VIII outlines provisions relating to the Trustee and/or Paying Agent‟s duties, legal 
protections, indemnifications as well circumstances wherein the Trustee would be granted the 
ability to resign. There is often an emphasis on Trustee obligations in the event of a servicer 
default. Typically, this section also requires that the Trustee have and maintain minimum credit 
ratings. Article VIII will usually grant the Trustee the right to resign from the position and 
governs the appropriate procedure for succession of the Trustee.  
 
Article IX: Termination 
This section outlines the provisions for the REMIC required 90 day liquidation period in the 
event of receipt of final payment or by the purchase of a terminating agent. This section also 
governs the handling of REO property during final liquidation.  
 
Article X: Additional Tax Provisions 
Article X outlines the Trustee‟s duties to maintain accounting records and binds them to all 
reporting and tax compliance duty in accordance with REMIC regulations while also affirms the 
Trustee‟s responsibility to ensure the maintained of REMIC status. Concordantly, this section 
transforms many of the REMIC regulations, such as prohibited transactions, from rules 
governing the tax treatment of the CMBS issue into an actual contractual obligation for the 
Trustee.  
 
 
 
44 | P a g e  
 
Article XI: Regulation AB 
This section outlines the necessary provisions to conform to SEC Regulation AB, which requires 
securities to conform to specific reporting requirements. Examples include Form 8-K for special 
events, Form 10-D for monthly distributions, and Form 10-K for annul servicer compliance, such 
as an accountant‟s attestation report, compliance certificates, and Sarbanes-Oxley certificates.  
 
Article XII: Miscellaneous 
Article XII contains requirements for amending the PSA. These amendments are typically 
divided by amendments that do require investor consent and categories of amendments that do 
not require investor consent.  The specific laws governing the contract are also cited in this area 
(note: PSA‟s are typically governed by New York law). Finally, Article XII outlines third party 
rights.   
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Chapter 7:  PSA Limitations on Optimal Loan Default and Modifications 
In recent times, much ado has been made of the limitations of Pooling and Servicing Agreements 
and their effect on the ability of special servicers to optimally modify loans in an effort to obtain 
the highest returns for the bondholders which they represent.  This section offers the reader a 
sincere effort to investigate these concerns.  
 
Recent research focused on subprime RMBS makes an effort to determine the actual limiting 
factors of Pooling and Servicing Agreements on the special servicer‟s ability to modify loans in 
arrears. While CMBS and RMBS differ substantially with regard to the characteristics of their 
underlying securities, particularly with regard to prepayment risk, the PSA restrictions and 
guidelines are very similar with regard to loan modification. Figure PSA-1 illustrates the most 
commonly occurring restrictions imposed on special servicers at the PSA level.
60
  
 
Figure PSA-1: Primary Restrictions of PSA’s on RMBS modification and their rate of occurrence 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually Say About Loan Modification? Preliminary Results and Implications  
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This information was obtained by the Berkeley Center for Law during research with the explicit 
intention to ascertain the actual limitations imposed by PSAs on single family subprime 
mortgage default remedies by conducting a thorough survey of 614 subprime RMBS PSAs. This 
data demonstrates the most common PSA level restrictions and their frequency of occurrence in 
PSAs. Because RMBS special servicing modification restrictions closely parallel those 
governing CMBS
61
, this data would seem to be a reasonable proxy for the approximate 
distribution of CMBS PSA restrictions. 
 
The PSA level restrictions listed in Figure PSA-1are all efforts to ensure that both the master and 
special servicers maintain their fiduciary duty to the bondholders at all time. However, these 
restrictions have no impact on the ability of the special servicer to cure a default except to ensure 
that such actions are in the best interests of the bondholders, which only serves to explicitly state 
the implied intention of maximizing bondholder value that occurs in a default event. Note that 
this information pertains to restrictions made in addition to existing REMIC requirements and 
regulations as well as common municipal law.  
 
For example, the notion that the servicers must service the loan without jeopardizing hazard 
insurance
62
 coverage simply serves to ensure that the property does not violate any covenants 
with their hazard insurance firm and remit their coverage. However, hazard insurance is required 
by almost every municipality in the country, and so no extraneous limitation is imposed upon the 
master servicer by this clause. As another example, the requirement to service the loan without 
                                                          
61 This fact was confirmed through conversations with industry experts 
62 In this regard, there is the difference between CMBS and RMBS in that CMBS mortgages almost never carry mortgage insurance 
47 | P a g e  
 
taking action adverse to the trust or trustee is simply a restatement of the special servicers role 
within the REMIC.  
 
This same study notes that outright bans on mortgage modification are rare, and in the dozen or 
so CMBS PSA‟s that have been reviewed as part of this thesis, particularly the guidelines 
covered in Article III of the observed PSA‟s, nothing that comes even remotely close to an 
outright ban on mortgage modification was observed.  
 
Based on the strength of the aformentioned research performed at Berkeley
63
 and interaction 
with industry leading special servicers
64
 the author concludes that Pooling and Servicing 
Agrements offer de minimus constraints on the special servicer‟s ability to optimize bondholder 
returns relative to their ability to act to cure default or reasonablyforeseeble default. Additionally, 
the author finds that, except as they reflect the limitations already set forth by REMIC 
regulations or state municipalities; PSA‟s present no hindrance to the ability of special servicers 
to engage in loan modification, loan sale, or foreclosure that would impede optimal returns to 
bondholders.  
 
CMBS Special Servicing Compensation Structure 
While the author finds that PSA‟s do not hinder potential cures to default, the author does find 
that the hierarchy and compensation structure contained within the PSA‟s offers potentially 
uncessary costs toCMBS bondholders. Pooling and Servicing Agreements allow the master 
                                                          
63 The author of this paper freely admits the relevance of this evidence is directly proportional to the degree of similarity between subprime 
RMBS and CMBS limitations on Special Servicers and this evidence should be taken accordingly 
64 See Acknowledgments section for the most prominent contributors – note that information relied on by the aforementioned was not used to 
determine the similarity between subprime RMBS and CMBS PSA level modification restrictions, but was used as an independent measure of 
loan modification restrictions occurring at the PSA level.  
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servicer to cure minor defaults such as assumption or assignment without approval, a lack of 
insurance, or a minor breach of covenant. However, any major modification involving actual or 
reasonably foreseeable default must be engaged through the special servicer. When a troubled 
mortgage is sent to special servicing, this automatically triggers the additional costs associated 
with special servicing. However, many of the modifications that a special servicer must make in 
default scenarios turn out to be relatively minor. For instance, a loan may enter arrears due to an 
unexpected tenant eviction at the property backing the mortgage. Suppose that the borrower 
could, in this circumstance, demonstrate a newly executed lease with a credit rated tenant due to 
take possession of the now vacant space in two months at an increased rent per square foot. In 
this instance, the special servicer may choose to grant forbearance rather than foreclose on the 
property. However, recall that in order for this to happen, the loan must be transferred to special 
servicing, thus forcing the bondholders to incur the fees associated with the special servicer. The 
special servicer receives the same fees for engaging complicated modifications as they do for 
engaging relatively expedient and simple modifications.  
 
Thus, the author concludes that going forward, PSAs should allow for a class of minor 
modifications to be made by the master servicer in conjunction with and on the advisement of the 
special servicer at a reduced fee, while leaving the current fee structure in place for major 
modification or foreclosure scenarios. 
65
 
 
 
  
                                                          
65 The Mortgage Bankers Association has released a White Paper entitled, “PSA Article III: Language” which addresses other shortcomings of 
PSA‟s that are outside the scope of this paper‟s specific focus on optimizing bondholder returns in default scenarios but will provide the reader 
with additional shortcomings of PSA‟s if so desired.  
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Chapter 8:  Limitations of REMIC Regulations as they Pertain to Preemptive Modification 
Much of the current concern over CMBS stems from the statutorily static nature of REMICs and 
the severe limitations governing the modification of assets within the REMIC absent a default or 
reasonably foreseeable default. Many advocate groups have called for changes to existing 
REMIC regulations that would allow for special servicers to engage in preemptive measures to 
limit losses for both borrowers and bondholders prior to actual or reasonably foreseeable 
default.
66
  In this section, an attempt shall be made to identify and assess the potential for these 
changes to provide mutually beneficial scenarios for bondholders and borrowers wherein returns 
are optimized and losses are minimized for each respective party.  
 
A recent white paper by the Real Estate Round Table succinctly summarizes many of the prior-
to-reasonably-foreseeable-default (preemptive) measures which might be used to belay a default 
occurrence in the absence of the relevant limiting REMIC restrictions and, most importantly, 
preceding an actual default:
67
  
 
1. Changes to the  amount and timing of principal or interest payments (including partial 
loan forgiveness, amortization modifications and prepayment recalculations, maturity 
date extensions, and interest accruals in the event of insufficient revenues to support 
interest payments) 
 
2. Changes to obligors and guarantees (including additions, substitutions and releases). 
 
3. Changes to loan payment options (including additions and deletions). 
 
4. Changes to reserve and escrow requirements. 
 
5. Changes to financial covenants. 
 
6. Changes to or removal of lock-out periods, permitted defeasance dates, etc. 
                                                          
66 Such as the Real Estate Round Table, The Mortgage Bankers Association, and The Commercial Mortgage Association to name a few.  
67 Real Estate Round Table,  White Paper, Provide Greater Temporary Flexibility to Modify Securitized Commercial Mortgage Loans 
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7. Changes to prepayment fees. 
 
8. Changes to permit borrower to obtain additional financing (mortgage or mezzanine). 
 
9. Changes to cash management (including cash traps) and/or use of trapped funds for 
property-related purposes. 
 
10. Changes to address issues involving required ratings for insurance providers, and 
concerns with the credit of lenders or banks holding escrows, as a result of the 
widespread effects of the credit crisis. 
 
11. Property level transfers and loan assumptions. 
 
In short, many are calling for a sweeping paradigm shift wherein the foundational REMIC 
concept of static pools is, at least temporarily, abandoned in favor of a wide ranging 
preemptively modifiable approach wherein either the special servicer or master servicer makes 
the determination to modify even though it is not in default or reasonably foreseeable default 
with the same credence afforded to default scenarios under the current regulation. While there is 
no doubt that such a free reign methodology would increase the flexibility afforded to servicers 
to modify loans, it is not clear that such modifications to the REMIC guidelines will guarantee or 
even increase the likelihood of improving returns and mitigating losses to bondholders and 
borrowers as there are several potential shortcomings to such an approach. 
 
Violations of Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders 
The first shortcoming of this approach is the implicit failure to maintain the fiduciary duty owed 
to the investors who had purchased cash flows backed by what they expected to be a fixed pools 
of assets only modifiable under certain conditions. With preemptive modifications, bondholders 
might suddenly find themselves receiving a stream of income from a security with a markedly 
different underlying source of revenue than they had initially purchased, without due cause.  This 
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would entail a fundamental change to the very nature of CMBS securities and investors would be 
left holding an entirely different instrument than they had initially invested in. The ability to 
swap assets in and out of the mortgage pool at the whim of the servicers would erode investor 
confidence in REMICS as there would be no guarantee that new assets backing the cash flows 
would be superior to those they replaced, again, prior to default. While efforts may be made to 
guarantee equal or greater value of like kind exchanges within the pool, the latter concern is 
particularly poignant given the abject failure of risk rating and evaluation in recent times.  By 
contrast, a loan that is in actual or imminent default presents a definitive loss of value as opposed 
to the hypothetical losses associated with preemptive modification.  
 
The impracticality of Preemptive Modification 
This leads us to the second pitfall of the preemptive modification movement, which is an 
apparent naivety on the part of many borrowers and their advocacy groups concerning both the 
willingness and ability of servicers to engage in preemptive modification. Master servicers, in 
their current form, lack the sophistication, experience, and human capital to perform the type of 
analysis necessary to make qualified determinations of loans likely to require preemptive 
modification. Additionally, in the short run, this strategy relies on the accurate prognostications 
of servicers, who are unqualified to offer such forecasts in even the best of times. It would then 
be highly inappropriate to thrust upon them such a responsibility in the midst of perhaps the most 
uncertain time in the history of modern real estate. 
 
Of course, borrowers hoping for modification could be the source of notification for potential 
future default scenarios, but such a model would be rife with agency risk, as borrowers would 
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potentially engage in aggressive negotiation attempts to receive an unnecessary or overly 
generation modification en masse. This risk is further elucidated when contrasted against both 
self-cure and re-default risk. One might find that they have a very difficult time arguing for the 
bondholder motivations for desiring the provision of discounts to principle and rate for the 
borrower in the absence of any reasonably foreseeable duress.  
 
One final point for consideration regarding the intractability of preemptive modification 
proposals lies in the ubiquitous promulgation of PSA level restrictions, which mirror the current 
REMIC regulations prohibiting preemptive modifications, in that the special servicer may only 
modify loans in actual or imminent default.
68
 Any changes to the REMIC regulations allowing 
for modification outside of the currently allowed default scenarios would also require 
government imposed modifications of the contractual obligations between the parties of the PSA; 
an act that will almost certainly erode investor confidence in the stability of CMBS and 
ultimately further dampen attempts to revive the currently languishing real estate securities 
market.  
 
Reasonably Foreseeable Default 
In connection with proposals to allow for preemptive modifications, there often exists a call for a 
more defined definition of “reasonably foreseeable default.” There are currently grumblings 
within the commercial real estate community that the lack of clarity in the current governing 
language is an impediment to successful loan modifications. The theory states that the language 
causes uncertainty for special servicers as to when a loan is in “reasonably foreseeable” default, 
                                                          
68 While most PSA‟s use the term “imminent default” it  is never-the-less standard industry practice to use “imminent default” and “reasonably 
foreseeable default” interchangeably 
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which in turn causes undue hesitancy for preemptive loan modification. If only special servicers 
were confident of their legal right to make preemptive modifications without fear of litigation, 
they would surely perform them more often, or so the theory goes.   
 
Despite these claims, the reasonable person standard that governs foreseeable default has been 
left intentionally vague by legislators in order to allow for maximal flexibility. In American law, 
the reasonable person standard allows for a wide range of potentially justifiable actions 
appropriate for complicated and unpredictable scenarios, such as defaults within CMBS. The 
reasonable person standard accomplishes this flexibility by providing a hypothetical figure by 
which to objectively judge a culpable agent‟s actions within a given context. The reasonable 
person standard also takes into account a person‟s knowledge, experience, and perceptions when 
judging their behavior and choices, which would presumably afford some degree of credence to 
the special servicer‟s particular brand of discernment. While a more tangible definition of 
“reasonably foreseeable” default would allow for greater certainty of modification rights going 
forward, such an act would, ironically, more than likely have the effect of narrowing the scope of 
the special servicer‟s options when responding to defaults rather than expanding it. During the 
course of the author‟s contact with special servicers, concerns over the definition of reasonably 
foreseeable default were repeatedly dismissed as unfounded.  
 
The Case for Balloon Extensions 
If there is a case to be made for the allowance of preemptive modification, it is one which argues 
for the granting of preemptive extensions on performing assets with impending balloon payments 
in the short run.  The current lack of liquidity coupled with declining property values will 
undoubtedly create default scenarios for otherwise performing assets that are simply unable to 
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refinance or sell their property at a price sufficient to pay off the loan balance when the note 
resets due to a severe shortage of available capital and dramatically increased lending standards. 
In instances where this is due to a lack of capital and not the asset fundamentals, there may be a 
well grounded argument for preemptive modifications in the form of loan extensions. The value 
of granting a preemptive extension as opposed to waiting for reset induced default lies in the 
foreknowledge of the modification for both the bondholders and the borrowers.  
 
Furthermore, the argument could be made that declining property values, increased lending 
standards, and the current lack of liquidity in the capital markets constitute a “reasonably 
foreseeable default” under existing REMIC regulations and PSA stipulations for performing 
properties with balloon payments coming due. Such an interpretation would dramatically 
increase the ease of integrating such an interpretation. Most importantly, the need for extensions 
are easily identifiable and do not suffer from the potential for borrower abuse that overshadows 
other preemptive modification measures. 
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Chapter 9: Limitations of REMIC regulations as they pertain to Actual or Imminent 
Default 
 
In this section, unnecessary limitations imposed on special servicers by REMIC regulations 
which limit maximal bondholder returns will be highlighted. In some cases, a hypothetical mini-
case will be provided to help elucidate the manner in which the suggested modification to 
existing regulations would be of benefit to bondholder returns.  
 
In general, REMIC regulations are very permissive when it comes to the modification of a loan 
that enters into arrears. However, there do seem to be a few specific instances in which 
modifications to REMIC regulations would help to maximize returns and mitigate losses to 
CMBS bondholders. 
 
Cross Collateralized Carve Outs 
Currently, REMIC legislation does not allow for the conversion of a single loan or loans secured 
by multiple properties into multiple loans, each secured by a single property.
69
 This restriction 
prohibits special servicers from isolating and modifying and/or foreclosing on the actual 
underperforming asset(s) in situations involving cross collateralized properties. Thus, in the 
event of a foreclosure all fees, costs, and discounts must be taken on a larger sum total while the 
performing assets are eliminated from the CMBS pool in order to reconcile the underperforming 
pieces. Allowing special servicers to carve out the underperforming assets while maintaining 
healthy properties would eliminate this counterproductive quirk in the current legislation and 
offer further options to mitigate bondholder losses when applicable.  
                                                          
69 As this constitutes a “substantial” change, see Appendix A-3 
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Cross Collateralized Carve Outs – An Example 
The Isenguard Investment Group issued a mortgage in the amount of $480 million with an 
interest only rate of 6.5% at an 80% Loan to Value ratio that was secured by three cross 
collateralized assets, Office Property A, Office Property B, and Retail Property C. The 
underwritten debt service coverage ratio was 1.15 and was expected to rise by approximately .03 
per fiscal year. Let us further assume that Properties A and B both offer 300,000 square feet of 
rentable space while Property C offers 600,000 square feet of rentable space all of which was 
expected to rent at $45 per foot on an annual basis and grow at a rate of 3% per year with a 
standard vacancy factor of 5%. All inclusive operating expenses were predicted to be 30% of Net 
Operating Income and grow at a rate of 3% per year. Figure CO-1 depicts the pro forma for this 
scenario.  
 
Now let us assume that the two office buildings, Property A and Property B, both unexpectedly 
signed marquee tenants and the aggregate rent per square foot actually increases as a result from 
$45 to $50. Meanwhile, Retail Property C lost both of its anchor tenants to bankruptcy and 
cannot find a replacement. Rents for Property C dropped to an aggregate of $20 due to rent 
decreases associated with “dark” clauses in the lease structure as well as the loss of performance 
rent. Despite the over performance of  Properties A and B, they could not compensate for the 
dramatic revenue and vacancy increases of Property C and the loan entered into default, as 
demonstrated in Figure CO-2. Let us further assume that the MSA in which the property exists is 
currently undergoing a recession, with particularly deleterious effects on retail, which is likely to 
make finding an appropriate anchor tenant a tumultuous task. Thus, these risks provide sufficient 
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incentive for a quick sale of the property due to fears of an ever worsening retail market. Note 
that as a reflection of this concern, the longer that Property C is held without an anchor tenant, 
the higher the cap rates rise as a result of the market perception of riskiness associated with this 
property.  
 
Figure CO-3 demonstrates the loss associated with a foreclosure if all of the assets are disposed 
of in Year 1 with a $71 million loss, with a loss of $69 million if the assets are sold in Year 2. 
Figure CO-7 demonstrates the substantial reach of the credit loss across multiple tranches in a 
foreclosure event for this scenario.  
 
By contrast, if the REMIC regulations were adjusted to allow for the division of the original loan 
into two separate loans, one governing Properties A and B and one governing Property C, the 
special servicer would be able to carve out the underperforming asset and utilize the over 
performance of the office properties to recover the lost funds at reversion. In this case, the loan 
has been modeled as being split into two halves based on the total square foot of the properties 
(600,000 total for A and B and 600,000 total for C) with a subordinate lien for the realized loss 
accompanied by the REO sale of Property C to be placed on Properties A and B as shown in 
Figure CO-5. The new loan would retain the same interest rate and terms in exchange for the 
subordinate lien against Properties A and B. All excess before tax profit would go to refund the 
principle loss incurred by the tranches initially impacted by the interest loss. Although the 
interest shortfall has been forgiven in this case to demonstrate the assumption of a certain degree 
of bargaining on the part of the borrower, this would not be necessary to demonstrate the 
superiority of this approach, for this scenario, if allowed. Figure CO-6 outlines the disposition of 
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Properties A and B and the final repayment t of the bondholders. Note that this scenario is 
preferred for both the borrower and the bondholders.  
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Material Improvements 
Once a property has been foreclosed upon, the special servicer can only perform maintenance 
and restoration, regardless of any functional obsolescence that might be present, or even the root 
cause of the default. Any additional improvements that constitute a fundamental change are not 
allowed. Thus, improvements that might bring the property in line with market amenities are not 
allowed as this would effect a “substantial” change to the collateral70. For example, while one 
could repair a leaky roof of an office building, one could not add a pool to a hotel. Thus, a 
property that has been foreclosed upon by a REMIC with the underlying asset failing to perform 
due to obsolescence or rapid changes in market demand will be unable to be repositioned to 
effectively address the new market realities and the bondholders will suffer for it at disposition. 
Standard industry practice, which calls for the utilization of capitalization rates to determine 
asset prices, can be particularly irksome when a special servicer is unable to make the 
aforementioned material modifications to properties. As a result, such a property will almost 
certainly underperform the market, resulting in a higher cap rate and lower sale price which will 
in turn increase the likelihood and depth of credit loss severity.   
 
Material Improvements – An Example 
The Isenguard Investment Group issued an interest only mortgage with an effective interest rate 
of 6.5% in the amount of $100 million at an 80% Loan to Value ratio. The mortgage was secured 
by The Antioch Tower, a 300,000 square foot Class B multifamily complex located in Miami, 
Florida. Rent was expected to be $35 per square foot on an annual basis with a 5% vacancy rate 
and a 3% year over year growth factor. Operating expenses were expected to be 30% of Net 
Operating Income. The borrowing entity is Eastman Private Equity (EPE), a small boutique firm 
                                                          
70 See Appendix A-3 
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looking to diversify their holdings with direct real estate exposure. Figure MC-1outlines the 
property pro forma.  
 
Unfortunately for EPE, their due diligence was sloppy and they failed to notice that several 
superior projects within a quarter mile were due to come online their first year operating The 
Antioch Tower. Rather than increase rents at a rate of 3% year over year, EPE was forced to 
lower rents 3% year over year in order to maintain their occupancy levels.  By the 3
rd
 year of 
operation, the property entered into default and with projections for continued decline and was 
subsequently foreclosed upon as demonstrated by Figure MC-2. 
 
Upon further review, the Special Servicer determined that competing properties all offered a roof 
top pool and sunbathing area, which were amenities in high demand with the area‟s dominant 
demographic; young upwardly mobile twenty-something‟s. The special servicer received an 
estimate of $10 million to add a rooftop pool to the property, but soon realized that such an 
improvement would constitute a material change to the collateral securing the mortgage and was 
thus prohibited by REMIC regulations. The resulting REO disposition under current REMIC 
regulations would result in losses between $5.5 million and nearly $14 million in realized losses 
contingent on how quickly the special Servicer could secure would be able to secure a buyer for 
the REO sale. Figure MC-6 illustrates the resulting credit loss to bondholders.  
 
In contrast, Figure MC-4 illustrates the expected performance of The Antioch Tower were it that 
the rooftop improvements could be made. This scenario assumes that the master servicer will 
advance a $10 million interest only loan to cover the cost of the improvements at an interest rate 
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of 11% with yearly debt service at $1.1 million. The relatively high interest rate is in keeping 
with the risk profile of the new loan given the pre-cure performance of the collateral at the time 
of issue. Figure MC-5 demonstrates the dramatic uptick in rental revenue as the property returns 
to a market competitive status and immediately begins to perform within the same year pro 
forma expectations. Any tranche principle erosion could be paid back to the bondholders
71
 with 
the property before tax cash flow and full recovery would be realized upon disposition of the 
asset, which would presumably occur in Year 4.  
 
 
  
                                                          
71 Or to the s=master servicer in the event that the interest was forwarded and deemed recoverable.  
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REO Hold Period 
Currently, the maximum hold period for REOs is three years, with an option to obtain an 
additional three year period of time, which is virtually always granted.  However, given the 
current state of the market as well as the expectations by many of a long tailed recovery, there 
exists considerable merit for special servicers wishing to assume a hold and wait posture. Yet, 
current uncertainty about the timeframe for market recovery coupled with the aforementioned 
restrictions for an REO hold period make this option riskier, and therefore less likely to be 
enacted, than it otherwise need be. Temporary increases to the allowable hold period would 
make this default cure option more palatable, as special servicers would have a longer horizon 
with which to time the market.  
 
REO Hold Period – An Example 
Let us assume that once again the Isenguard Investment Group has issued an interest only 
mortgage with an effective interest rate of 6.5% in the amount of $100 million at an 80% Loan to 
Value ratio this time to a self storage building, Scott Storage, in Corona, California in 2006. 
Buoyed by demand, Scott Storage chose to refinance their existing loan at the end of 2005 in 
order to receive cash proceeds in an effort to expand their business. The pro forma for their 
existing property can be seen in Figure REO-1.  
 
Despite the unexpected dawn of the housing crisis at year end 2006, Scott Storage was initially 
hopeful that the particularly hard hit city of Corona would improve demand for self storage as 
residents were forced to downgrade or relocate through foreclosure. However, the primary 
motivation for many Californians to relocate to Corona, which is on the far outskirts of the Los 
Angeles suburbs, was driven by the opportunity to become home owners. Absent this incentive, 
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most of the Corona residents chose to relocate back into the heart of Los Angeles and 
subsequently used storage that would be closer to their new home. While Scott Storage‟s 
efficient design and premium positioning allowed them to charge a relatively high rent per 
square foot for their services, their business suffered from a general lack of demand due to the 
relocation phenomenon caused by the housing crisis. In order to maintain occupancy levels, they 
chose to compete on price by adjusting their rents downward. Thus, far from growing at the 
projected 3% per year, their rents began to decline, as demonstrated in Figure REO-2. 
 
Consequently, Scott Storage entered default at the end of Year 3 and was subsequently 
foreclosed upon at the beginning of Year 4. Upon due diligence, the Special Servicer concluded 
that Corona presented an unusually diversified economy that continued to demonstrate positive 
signs of growth despite the current housing led recession. Corona was also the suburb nearest to 
Los Angeles able to absorb the continued population increases of Los Angeles County and 
offered businesses and their employees close proximity to prestigious North Orange County 
suburbs with similar quality of life at a substantial price discount.  Although the current 
economic crisis was daunting, nearly all economic forecasts predicted that the unusually strong 
Corona economy would begin to recover within 3 years. The long run economic outlook for 
Corona was set to outpace area growth by a factor of 300 percent and although Corona had been 
among the hardest hit cities in the state due to the artificial housing bubble, its fundamentals 
were still noteworthy.  
 
Thus, the special servicer determined that the highest value to the bondholders would be to 
foreclose and retain the property for a period of 8 – 10 years in order to allow the cycle of cap 
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rate expansion and recompression to bring cap rates back in line with historical expectations 
while Corona‟s strong fundamentals returned the property to strong performance. However, the 
special servicer was limited by REMIC regulations that only allowed for a three year hold period, 
and at best, an additional three year extension. The special servicer could not justify a six year 
horizon and so foreclosed upon, and sold the asset. Figure REO-3 shows the expected Return to 
bondholders from foreclosure and disposition across the REO hold period, allowing for a simple 
year by year comparison of expected returns. By contrast, Figure REO-4 shows the best 
projected credit loss severity for the bondholders, approximately $5.25 million, assuming the 
deposition at the end of the current maximum 6 year hold period.  
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REO Debt Lending 
Under the current REMIC regulations, once a special servicer forecloses on a property the 
mortgage is deemed to no longer exist. Consequently, a special servicer cannot in turn provide 
new funds the loan once a property has entered foreclosure, nor can the special servicer use 
proceeds from the disposition of the foreclosed asset to make a new loan against the asset to the 
purchaser as this violates the ninety days from startup rule governing qualified mortgages.
72
 
Efforts to examine this particular restriction are timely given the current credit crisis which has 
engulfed the world‟s capital markets.  Presumably, this restriction is in place to prevent a 
significant alteration to the length of the mortgage. However, a temporary allowance for special 
servicers to create new mortgages to fund the sale of foreclosed assets would allow for an 
increase in the number of potential buyers for foreclosed properties, as many willing purchasers 
are simply without access to funds given the current state of the market. In the long run, this 
might prove to be a viable permanent modification if care was enacted to ensure that there were 
no significant and unnecessary alterations to the timing and length of the cash flows. 
 
  
                                                          
72 See Appendix A-2 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
The current troubles in the real estate market are vast, complex, and systemic. There is no simple 
way to erase the losses associated with poor investment decisions and the global economy has 
had a bitter pill to swallow. The allowance of preemptive modifications to qualified mortgages 
would only encourage borrowers to seek modifications en masse, further erode confidence in the 
system, and rely on the expertise of those unqualified to make forward looking prognostications. 
Additionally, the author finds that calls for the clarification of “reasonably foreseeable default” 
in order to embolden special servicers to take preemptive action are largely unfounded.  
 
However, there remain at least a few ways in which we may improve the current REMIC 
regulations and PSA‟s to maximize returns and minimize losses to CMBS bondholders. The first 
is to modify the structure of PSA‟s going forward to allow for greater collaboration between 
master servicers and special servicers in cases where the default resolution is relatively minor, 
with a lower fee apportioned to the special servicer so as to avoid excessive fees for bondholders. 
Second, enact amendments to the restrictions governing material changes to collateral when a 
qualified mortgage enters default that allow for carve outs as well as material improvements to 
the asset as needed.  
 
In addition, there are three short run measures that could be enacted to create relief in recognition 
of the current economic climate. The first is to enact a temporary safe harbor for CMBS issued 
between 2003 and 2008 to allow for preemptive extensions of balloon payments, at the special 
servicers discretion, for performing properties with reset payments coming due. The second 
would be an extension of the expected six year REO hold period to allow sufficient time for 
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special servicers to wait for stabilization of the commercial real estate market.  Finally, as an 
additional short term stop loss measure, legislators should grant a temporary allowance for the 
lending of REMIC funds to purchasers of properties foreclosed upon  by the REMIC until such a 
time that healthy levels of liquidity return to the capital  markets. This measure could be enacted 
in the long run if care was taken to ensure that there were no significant and unnecessary 
alterations to the timing and length of the cash flows.  
  
68 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibits 
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Figure CO-1: Original Pro Forma for Cross Collateralized Properties A, B, and C 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Property A Market Rent $13,500,000 $13,905,000 $14,322,150 $14,751,815 $15,194,369 $15,650,200 $16,119,706 $16,603,297 $17,101,396 $17,614,438
Property A Vacancy ($675,000) ($695,250) ($716,108) ($737,591) ($759,718) ($782,510) ($805,985) ($830,165) ($855,070) ($880,722)
Property B Market Rent $13,500,000 $13,905,000 $14,322,150 $14,751,815 $15,194,369 $15,650,200 $16,119,706 $16,603,297 $17,101,396 $17,614,438
Property B Vacancy ($675,000) ($695,250) ($716,108) ($737,591) ($759,718) ($782,510) ($805,985) ($830,165) ($855,070) ($880,722)
Property C Market Rent $27,000,000 $27,810,000 $28,644,300 $29,503,629 $30,388,738 $31,300,400 $32,239,412 $33,206,594 $34,202,792 $35,228,876
Property C Vacancy ($1,350,000) ($1,390,500) ($1,432,215) ($1,475,181) ($1,519,437) ($1,565,020) ($1,611,971) ($1,660,330) ($1,710,140) ($1,761,444)
Effective Gross Income $51,300,000 $52,839,000 $54,424,170 $56,056,895 $57,738,602 $59,470,760 $61,254,883 $63,092,529 $64,985,305 $66,934,864
Operating Expenses & Taxes $15,390,000 $15,851,700 $16,327,251 $16,817,069 $17,321,581 $17,841,228 $18,376,465 $18,927,759 $19,495,592 $20,080,459
Net O perating Income $35,910,000 $36,987,300 $38,096,919 $39,239,827 $40,417,021 $41,629,532 $42,878,418 $44,164,771 $45,489,714 $46,854,405
Debt Service ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000)
DSCR 1.151 1.185 1.221 1.258 1.295 1.334 1.374 1.416 1.458 1.502
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow $4,710,000 $5,787,300 $6,896,919 $8,039,827 $9,217,021 $10,429,532 $11,678,418 $12,964,771 $14,289,714 $15,654,405  
Figure CO-2: Actual Performance of Cross Collateralized Properties A, B, and C  
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Property A Market Rent $15,000,000 $15,450,000 $15,913,500 $16,390,905 $16,882,632 $17,389,111 $17,910,784 $18,448,108 $19,001,551 $19,571,598
Standard Market Vacancy ($750,000) ($772,500) ($795,675) ($819,545) ($844,132) ($869,456) ($895,539) ($922,405) ($950,078) ($978,580)
Property B Market Rent $15,000,000 $15,450,000 $15,913,500 $16,390,905 $16,882,632 $17,389,111 $17,910,784 $18,448,108 $19,001,551 $19,571,598
standard Market Vacancy ($750,000) ($772,500) ($795,675) ($819,545) ($844,132) ($869,456) ($895,539) ($922,405) ($950,078) ($978,580)
Property C Market Rent $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000 $12,000,000
Standard Market Vacancy ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000)
Effective Gross Income $38,700,000 $39,555,000 $40,435,650 $41,342,720 $42,277,001 $43,239,311 $44,230,490 $45,251,405 $46,302,947 $47,386,036
Operating Expenses & Taxes $11,610,000 $11,958,300 $12,317,049 $12,686,560 $13,067,157 $13,459,172 $13,862,947 $14,278,836 $14,707,201 $15,148,417
Net O perating Income $27,090,000 $27,596,700 $28,118,601 $28,656,159 $29,209,844 $29,780,139 $30,367,543 $30,972,570 $31,595,747 $32,237,619
Debt Service ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000) ($31,200,000)
DSCR 0.868 0.885 0.901 0.918 0.936 0.954 0.973 0.993 1.013 1.033
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow ($4,110,000) ($3,603,300) ($3,081,399) ($2,543,841) ($1,990,156) ($1,419,861) ($832,457) ($227,430) $395,747 $1,037,619  
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Figure CO-3: Disposition of Properties A, B, and C at Year 1 and Year 2 
Year 1 Year 2
Implied Cap 6.25% 6.35%
Market Asset Value $433,440,000 $434,593,701
Sales Commission ($4,334,400) ($4,345,937)
Foreclosure Cost ($43,344,000) ($43,459,370)
Interest Income $27,090,000 $27,596,700
Interest Shorfall ($4,110,000) ($3,603,300)
Loan Balance ($480,000,000) ($480,000,000)
Total Return ($71,258,400) ($69,218,206)  
 
Figure CO-4: Properties A and B Carve Out Performance 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Property A Market Rent $15,000,000 $15,450,000 $15,913,500 $16,390,905 $16,882,632 $17,389,111 $17,910,784 $18,448,108 $19,001,551 $19,571,598
Property A Vacancy ($750,000) ($772,500) ($795,675) ($819,545) ($844,132) ($869,456) ($895,539) ($922,405) ($950,078) ($978,580)
Property B Market Rent $15,000,000 $15,450,000 $15,913,500 $16,390,905 $16,882,632 $17,389,111 $17,910,784 $18,448,108 $19,001,551 $19,571,598
Property B Vacancy ($750,000) ($772,500) ($795,675) ($819,545) ($844,132) ($869,456) ($895,539) ($922,405) ($950,078) ($978,580)
Effective Gross Income $28,500,000 $29,355,000 $30,235,650 $31,142,720 $32,077,001 $33,039,311 $34,030,490 $35,051,405 $36,102,947 $37,186,036
Operating Expenses & Taxes $8,550,000 $8,806,500 $9,070,695 $9,342,816 $9,623,100 $9,911,793 $10,209,147 $10,515,422 $10,830,884 $11,155,811
Net O perating Income $19,950,000 $20,548,500 $21,164,955 $21,799,904 $22,453,901 $23,127,518 $23,821,343 $24,535,984 $25,272,063 $26,030,225
Debt Service ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000)
DSCR 1.279 1.317 1.357 1.397 1.439 1.483 1.527 1.573 1.620 1.669
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow $4,350,000 $4,948,500 $5,564,955 $6,199,904 $6,853,901 $7,527,518 $8,221,343 $8,935,984 $9,672,063 $10,430,225
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Figure CO-5: Property C Carve out and Disposition 
 
Year 1 Year 2
Property C Market Rent $12,000,000 $12,000,000
Property C Vacancy ($1,800,000) ($1,800,000)
Effective  Gross Income $10,200,000 $10,200,000
Operating Expenses & Taxes $3,060,000 $3,151,800
Net O perating Income $7,140,000 $7,048,200
Debt Service ($15,600,000) ($15,600,000)
DSCR 0.458 0.452
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow (8,460,000) (8,551,800)
Year 1 Year 2
Market Cap 6.25% 6.35%
Market Asset Value $114,240,000 $110,995,276
Sales Commission ($1,142,400) ($1,109,953)
Foreclosure Cost ($11,424,000) ($11,099,528)
Interest Income $7,140,000 $7,048,200
Interest Loss ($8,460,000) ($8,551,800)
Loan Balance ($240,000,000) ($240,000,000)
Proceeds from Sale ($139,646,400) ($142,717,805)  
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Figure CO-6: Disposition of Carved out Properties A & B and repayment to bondholders 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Cap 6.25% 6.35% 6.45% 6.55% 6.55% 6.55% 6.55% 6.55% 6.55% 6.55%
Market Asset Value $319,200,000 $323,598,425 $328,138,837 $332,822,956 $342,807,645 $353,091,875 $363,684,631 $374,595,170 $385,833,025 $397,408,016
Sales Commission (3,192,000) (3,235,984) (3,281,388) (3,328,230) (3,428,076) (3,530,919) (3,636,846) (3,745,952) (3,858,330) (3,974,080)
Loan Balance (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000) (240,000,000)
Proceeds from Sale $76,008,000 $80,362,441 $84,857,449 $89,494,727 $99,379,569 $109,560,956 $120,047,784 $130,849,218 $141,974,695 $153,433,935
Realized Loss of Property C (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805) (142,717,805)
Funds Available for repayment $1,212,981 $1,569,721 $1,985,175 $2,464,026 $3,011,279 $3,632,277 $4,332,723 $5,118,705 $5,996,718 $6,973,692
Reimbursement Fund $1,212,981 $2,782,702 $4,767,877 $7,231,903 $10,243,182 $13,875,459 $18,208,183 $23,326,888 $29,323,606 $36,297,298
Bondholder Loss ($65,496,824) ($59,572,662) ($53,092,479) ($45,991,175) ($33,095,054) ($19,281,390) ($4,461,838) $11,458,301 $28,580,496 $47,013,429
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Figure CO-7: Credit Loss Severity of Foreclosure on properties A, B, and C ($40,997,657) 
 
 
Tranche Rating Subordination Balance Credit Support
A-1 Aaa 30.00% $7,127,500 $542,313,850
A-2 Aaa 30.00% $51,305,250 $535,186,350
A-3 Aaa 30.00% $7,780,750 $483,881,100
A-PB Aaa 30.00% $16,517,750 $476,100,350
A-4 Aaa 30.00% $171,858,750 $459,582,600
A-1A Aaa 30.00% $126,926,500 $287,723,850
AM Aaa 20.00% $54,502,250 $160,797,350
AJ Aaa 14.00% $32,701,500 $106,295,100
B Aa1 12.75% $6,812,750 $73,593,600
C Aa2 11.63% $6,131,500 $66,780,850
D Aa3 10.50% $6,131,500 $60,649,350
E A! 9.75% $4,087,750 $54,517,850
F A2 8.88% $4,768,750 $50,430,100
G A3 7.88% $5,450,250 $45,661,350
H Baa1 6.63% $6,813,000 $40,211,100
J Baa2 5.38% $6,812,750 $33,398,100
K Baa3 4.25% $6,131,500 $26,585,350
L Ba1 3.50% $4,087,750 $20,453,850
M Ba2 3.13% $2,043,750 $16,366,100
N Ba3 2.75% $2,043,750 $14,322,350
O B1 2.50% $1,362,500 $12,278,600
P B2 2.25% $1,362,750 $10,916,100
Q B3 1.88% $2,043,750 $9,553,350
S NR 0.00% $7,509,600 $7,509,600
WAC IO Aaa $545,023,451
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Figure MC-1: Pro Forma 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Rent $10,500,000 $10,710,000 $10,924,200 $11,142,684 $11,365,538 $11,592,848 $11,824,705 $12,061,200 $12,302,424 $12,548,472
Standard Market Vacancy ($525,000) ($535,500) ($546,210) ($557,134) ($568,277) ($579,642) ($591,235) ($603,060) ($615,121) ($627,424)
Effective Gross Income $9,975,000 $10,174,500 $10,377,990 $10,585,550 $10,797,261 $11,013,206 $11,233,470 $11,458,140 $11,687,302 $11,921,048
Operating Expenses & Taxes ($2,992,500) ($3,052,350) ($3,113,397) ($3,175,665) ($3,239,178) ($3,303,962) ($3,370,041) ($3,437,442) ($3,506,191) ($3,576,315)
Net Operating Income $6,982,500 $7,122,150 $7,264,593 $7,409,885 $7,558,083 $7,709,244 $7,863,429 $8,020,698 $8,181,112 $8,344,734
Debt Service ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000)
DSCR 1.074 1.096 1.118 1.140 1.163 1.186 1.210 1.234 1.259 1.284
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow $482,500 $622,150 $764,593 $909,885 $1,058,083 $1,209,244 $1,363,429 $1,520,698 $1,681,112 $1,844,734
 
 
Figure MC-2: Actual Performance and Foreclosure 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Rent $10,500,000 $10,185,000 $9,879,450 $9,583,067 $9,295,575 $9,016,707 $8,746,206 $8,483,820 $8,229,305 $7,982,426
Standard Market Vacancy ($525,000) ($509,250) ($493,973) ($479,153) ($464,779) ($450,835) ($437,310) ($424,191) ($411,465) ($399,121)
Effective Gross Income $9,975,000 $9,675,750 $9,385,478 $9,103,913 $8,830,796 $8,565,872 $8,308,896 $8,059,629 $7,817,840 $7,583,305
Operating Expenses & Taxes ($2,992,500) ($3,082,275) ($3,174,743) ($3,269,986) ($3,368,085) ($3,469,128) ($3,573,201) ($3,680,398) ($3,790,809) ($3,904,534)
Net Operating Income $6,982,500 $6,593,475 $6,210,734 $5,833,928 $5,462,711 $5,096,744 $4,735,694 $4,379,231 $4,027,031 $3,678,771
Debt Service ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000)
DSCR 1.074 1.014 0.955 0.898 0.840 0.784 0.729 0.674 0.620 0.566
Foreclosure  Cost (9,937,174.80)
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow $482,500 93,475.00 (10,226,440.55) (666,072.37) (1,037,289.33) (1,403,255.76) (1,764,305.75) (2,120,768.67) (2,472,969.46) (2,821,228.94)
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Figure MC-3: Disposition without Cure 
Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Cap 6.25% 6.35% 6.45% 6.55% 6.65% 6.75% 6.85% 6.95%
Market Asset Value $99,371,748 $91,872,876 $84,693,189 $77,812,889 $71,213,447 $64,877,501 $58,788,767 $52,931,958
Foreclosure Cost ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175)
Sales Commission ($993,717) ($918,729) ($846,932) ($778,129) ($712,134) ($648,775) ($587,888) ($529,320)
Interest Income $6,210,734 $5,833,928 $5,462,711 $5,096,744 $4,735,694 $4,379,231 $4,027,031 $3,678,771
Interest Shortfall ($289,266) ($666,072) ($1,037,289) ($1,403,256) ($1,764,306) ($2,120,769) ($2,472,969) ($2,821,229)
Loan Balance ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000)
Total Return ($5,637,676) ($13,815,172) ($21,665,497) ($29,208,926) ($36,464,473) ($43,449,986) ($50,182,234) ($56,676,995)  
 
 
Figure MC-4: Asset Performance after Cure of Obsolescence  
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Rent $10,500,000 $10,185,000 $9,879,450 $11,473,634 $11,817,843 $12,172,378 $12,537,549 $12,913,676 $13,301,086 $13,700,118
Standard Market Vacancy ($525,000) ($509,250) ($493,973) ($573,682) ($590,892) ($608,619) ($626,877) ($645,684) ($665,054) ($685,006)
Effective Gross Income $9,975,000 $9,675,750 $9,385,478 $10,899,952 $11,226,950 $11,563,759 $11,910,672 $12,267,992 $12,636,032 $13,015,113
Operating Expenses & Taxes ($2,992,500) ($3,082,275) ($3,174,743) ($3,269,986) ($3,368,085) ($3,469,128) ($3,573,201) ($3,680,398) ($3,790,809) ($3,904,534)
Net O perating Income $6,982,500 $6,593,475 $6,210,734 $7,629,966 $7,858,865 $8,094,631 $8,337,470 $8,587,594 $8,845,222 $9,110,579
Debt Service ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000)
Cost to cure obsolesence Debt Service $0 ($1,100,000) ($1,100,000) ($1,100,000) ($1,100,000) ($1,100,000) ($1,100,000) ($1,100,000)
DSCR 1.074 1.014 0.955 1.004 1.034 1.065 1.097 1.130 1.164 1.199
Foreclosure Costs (9,937,174.80)
Property Before Tax Cash Flow 482,500.00 93,475.00 (10,226,440.55) 29,966.28 258,865.27 494,631.22 737,470.16 987,594.27 1,245,222.09 1,510,578.76  
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Figure MC-5: Disposition of Asset after Cure of Obsolescence  
 
Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Cap 6.25% 6.35% 6.45% 6.55% 6.65% 6.75% 6.85% 6.95%
Market Asset Value $99,371,748 $120,156,949 $121,842,872 $123,582,156 $125,375,491 $127,223,619 $129,127,330 $131,087,464
Cost to cure ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000) ($10,000,000)
Foreclosure Cost ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175) ($9,937,175)
Sales Commission ($993,717) ($1,201,569) ($1,218,429) ($1,235,822) ($1,253,755) ($1,272,236) ($1,291,273) ($1,310,875)
Interest Income $6,210,734 $7,629,966 $7,858,865 $8,094,631 $8,337,470 $8,587,594 $8,845,222 $9,110,579
Interest Loss ($289,266) $1,129,966 $1,358,865 $1,594,631 $1,837,470 $2,087,594 $2,345,222 $2,610,579
Loan Balance ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000)
Excess Return ($15,637,676) $7,778,138 $9,904,999 $12,098,422 $14,359,502 $16,689,396 $19,089,326 $21,560,572
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Figure MC-6: Credit Loss Severity Assuming 1 Year for Sale After Foreclosure: 
$13,815,172 
Tranche Rating Subordination Balance Credit Support
A-1 Aaa 30.00% $7,127,500 $542,313,850
A-2 Aaa 30.00% $51,305,250 $535,186,350
A-3 Aaa 30.00% $7,780,750 $483,881,100
A-PB Aaa 30.00% $16,517,750 $476,100,350
A-4 Aaa 30.00% $171,858,750 $459,582,600
A-1A Aaa 30.00% $126,926,500 $287,723,850
AM Aaa 20.00% $54,502,250 $160,797,350
AJ Aaa 14.00% $32,701,500 $106,295,100
B Aa1 12.75% $6,812,750 $73,593,600
C Aa2 11.63% $6,131,500 $66,780,850
D Aa3 10.50% $6,131,500 $60,649,350
E A! 9.75% $4,087,750 $54,517,850
F A2 8.88% $4,768,750 $50,430,100
G A3 7.88% $5,450,250 $45,661,350
H Baa1 6.63% $6,813,000 $40,211,100
J Baa2 5.38% $6,812,750 $33,398,100
K Baa3 4.25% $6,131,500 $26,585,350
L Ba1 3.50% $4,087,750 $20,453,850
M Ba2 3.13% $2,043,750 $16,366,100
N Ba3 2.75% $2,043,750 $14,322,350
O B1 2.50% $1,362,500 $12,278,600
P B2 2.25% $1,362,750 $10,916,100
Q B3 1.88% $2,043,750 $9,553,350
S NR 0.00% $7,509,600 $7,509,600
WAC IO Aaa $545,023,451
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Figure REO- 1: Original Pro Forma 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Market Rent 10,500,000.00 10,710,000.00 10,924,200.00 11,142,684.00 11,365,537.68 11,592,848.43 11,824,705.40 12,061,199.51 12,302,423.50 12,548,471.97
Standard Market Vacancy (525,000.00) (535,500.00) (546,210.00) (557,134.20) (568,276.88) (579,642.42) (591,235.27) (603,059.98) (615,121.18) (627,423.60)
Effective Gross Income 9,975,000.00 10,174,500.00 10,377,990.00 10,585,549.80 10,797,260.80 11,013,206.01 11,233,470.13 11,458,139.53 11,687,302.33 11,921,048.37
Operating Expenses & Taxes (2,992,500.00) (3,052,350.00) (3,113,397.00) (3,175,664.94) (3,239,178.24) (3,303,961.80) (3,370,041.04) (3,437,441.86) (3,506,190.70) (3,576,314.51)
Net Operating Income 6,982,500.00 7,122,150.00 7,264,593.00 7,409,884.86 7,558,082.56 7,709,244.21 7,863,429.09 8,020,697.67 8,181,111.63 8,344,733.86
Debt Service (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00) (6,500,000.00)
DSCR 1.07 1.10 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.19 1.21 1.23 1.26 1.28
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow 482,500.00 622,150.00 764,593.00 909,884.86 1,058,082.56 1,209,244.21 1,363,429.09 1,520,697.67 1,681,111.63 1,844,733.86
 
Figure REO- 2: Actual Performance 
Hold - Year 1 Hold - Year 2 Hold - Year 3 Hold - Year 4 Hold - Year 5 Hold - Year 6 Hold - Year 7 Hold - Year 8 Hold - Year 9 Hold - Year 10
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14
Market Rent $10,500,000 $10,185,000 $9,879,450 $9,583,067 $9,295,575 $9,481,486 $9,955,560 $10,951,116 $11,279,650 $11,618,039 $11,850,400 $12,087,408 $12,329,156 $12,575,739
Rent Growth -3% -3% -3% -3% -3% 2% 5% 10% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Standard Market Vacancy ($525,000) ($509,250) ($493,973) ($479,153) ($464,779) ($474,074) ($497,778) ($547,556) ($563,982) ($580,902) ($592,520) ($604,370) ($616,458) ($628,787)
Effective Gross Income $9,975,000 $9,675,750 $9,385,478 $9,103,913 $8,830,796 $9,007,412 $9,457,782 $10,403,561 $10,715,667 $11,037,137 $11,257,880 $11,483,038 $11,712,698 $11,946,952
Operating Expenses & Taxes ($2,992,500) ($3,082,275) ($3,174,743) ($3,269,986) ($3,368,085) ($3,469,128) ($3,573,201) ($3,680,398) ($3,790,809) ($3,904,534) ($4,021,670) ($4,142,320) ($4,266,589) ($4,394,587)
Net O perating Income $6,982,500 $6,593,475 $6,210,734 $5,833,928 $5,462,711 $5,538,284 $5,884,581 $6,723,163 $6,924,858 $7,132,604 $7,236,210 $7,340,718 $7,446,109 $7,552,365
Debt Service ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000) ($6,500,000)
DSCR 1.074 1.014 0.955 0.898 0.840 0.852 0.905 1.034 1.065 1.097 1.113 1.129 1.146 1.162
Foreclosure  Cost (7,778,570)
Property Before-Tax Cash Flow 482,500 93,475 (289,266) (8,444,643) (1,037,289) (961,716) (615,419) 223,163 424,858 632,604 736,210 840,718 946,109 1,052,365
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Figure REO-3: Disposition Calculations 
 
REO Hold - Year 1 REO  Hold - Year 2 REO Hold - Year 3 REO Hold - Year 4 REO Hold - Year 5 REO Hold - Year 6 REO Hold - Year 7 REO Hold - Year 8 REO Hold - Year 9 REO Hold - Year 10
Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14
Market Cap 7.50% 8.00% 8.50% 8.25% 8.00% 7.50% 7.25% 7.15% 6.50% 6.25% 6.25%
Market Asset Value $77,785,702 $68,283,883 $65,156,283 $71,328,252 $84,039,537 $92,331,438 $98,380,739 $101,205,739 $112,934,121 $119,137,744 $120,837,844
Foreclosure Cost ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570) ($7,778,570)
Sales Commission ($777,857) ($682,839) ($651,563) ($713,283) ($840,395) ($923,314) ($983,807) ($1,012,057) ($1,129,341) ($1,191,377) ($1,208,378)
Interest Income $5,833,928 $5,462,711 $5,538,284 $5,884,581 $6,723,163 $6,924,858 $7,132,604 $7,236,210 $7,340,718 $7,446,109 $7,552,365
Interest Shortfall ($666,072) ($1,703,362) ($2,665,078) ($3,280,497) ($3,057,334) ($2,632,476) ($1,999,872) ($1,263,662) ($422,944) $523,165 $1,575,530
Loan Balance ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000) ($100,000,000)
Total Return ($25,602,870) ($36,418,177) ($40,400,644) ($34,559,517) ($20,913,599) ($12,078,065) ($5,248,907) ($1,612,341) $10,943,983 $18,137,070 $20,978,791
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REO Figure 4: Credit Support Loss in year 6:  ($5,248,907) 
 
 
Tranche Rating Subordination Balance Credit Support
A-1 Aaa 30.00% $7,127,500 $542,313,850
A-2 Aaa 30.00% $51,305,250 $535,186,350
A-3 Aaa 30.00% $7,780,750 $483,881,100
A-PB Aaa 30.00% $16,517,750 $476,100,350
A-4 Aaa 30.00% $171,858,750 $459,582,600
A-1A Aaa 30.00% $126,926,500 $287,723,850
AM Aaa 20.00% $54,502,250 $160,797,350
AJ Aaa 14.00% $32,701,500 $106,295,100
B Aa1 12.75% $6,812,750 $73,593,600
C Aa2 11.63% $6,131,500 $66,780,850
D Aa3 10.50% $6,131,500 $60,649,350
E A! 9.75% $4,087,750 $54,517,850
F A2 8.88% $4,768,750 $50,430,100
G A3 7.88% $5,450,250 $45,661,350
H Baa1 6.63% $6,813,000 $40,211,100
J Baa2 5.38% $6,812,750 $33,398,100
K Baa3 4.25% $6,131,500 $26,585,350
L Ba1 3.50% $4,087,750 $20,453,850
M Ba2 3.13% $2,043,750 $16,366,100
N Ba3 2.75% $2,043,750 $14,322,350
O B1 2.50% $1,362,500 $12,278,600
P B2 2.25% $1,362,750 $10,916,100
Q B3 1.88% $2,043,750 $9,553,350
S NR 0.00% $7,509,600 $7,509,600
WAC IO Aaa $545,023,451
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Appendix A-1: A selection of typical provisions governing master servicers
73
 
 
1. Furnish Necessary Information. The servicer is required to provide to the trustee upon 
request any information as the trustee may need with respect to the mortgage loans that 
the servicer is servicing. 
 
2. Trustee to Act or Not Act. The servicer may require the trustee to take certain actions or 
refrain from taking such actions as to the REMIC assets if the servicer furnishes the 
trustee an opinion of counsel stating that such actions or inactions may or may not result 
in an adverse REMIC event. 
 
 
3. Payment of Prohibited Transaction Taxes. The servicer is required to pay any taxes levied 
on the trust resulting from a Prohibited Transaction caused by a breach in the servicer‟s 
obligations under the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement or if the servicer, in its 
discretion, has determined to indemnify the Trust Fund against the imposing of such 
taxes. 
 
4. No Contributions of Assets. The servicer is prohibited from accepting any contributions 
of assets to the REMIC, except with respect to substitutions for Defective Qualified 
Mortgages, unless the servicer receives an opinion of counsel from the party seeking to 
make such contributions stating that such contributions will not cause the REMIC to fail 
to qualify as a REMIC at any time that the certificates are outstanding or subject the 
REMIC to any tax under federal, state or local laws. 
 
 
5. No Fees or Income Other Than From Qualified Mortgages or Permitted Investments. The 
servicer is prohibited from entering into any arrangement by which the REMIC will 
receive any fees or other compensation and allowing the REMIC to accept any income 
from assets other than Qualified Mortgages or Permitted Investments. 
 
6. No Disposition of Assets. The servicer is prohibited from selling, disposing of or 
substituting for any of the mortgage loans it services, except in connection with the (i) 
default, imminent default or foreclosure of a mortgage loan, including but not limited to 
properties acquired or sold by deed in lieu of foreclosure, (ii) bankruptcy of the REMIC, 
(iii) termination of the REMIC pursuant to the applicable Pooling and Servicing 
Agreement and (iv) purchase or repurchase of mortgage loans pursuant to the applicable 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement. Similarly, the servicer is prohibited from acquiring 
any assets for the REMIC, selling or disposing of any investments in the collection 
accounts for gain and accepting any contributions to the REMIC after the closing date, 
unless the servicer receives an opinion of counsel that such, disposition, substitution or 
acquisition will not adversely affect the status of the REMIC or unless the servicer has 
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determined, in its discretion, to indemnify the Trust Fund against any taxes imposed on 
the REMIC as a result thereof. 
 
7. No Modifications, Waivers or Amendments. The servicer agrees to protect the interests 
of the Trust Fund as it would protect its interests in its own mortgage portfolio and agreed 
not to make or permit any modification, waiver or amendment of any applicable 
mortgage loan which would cause the REMIC to fail to qualify as a REMIC or resulting 
in the imposition of any tax under Section 860F(a) or Section 860G(d) of the IRC. 
 
8. Management of Foreclosure Property. The Master Servicer is required to dispose of any 
mortgage property acquired by the Trust Fund with respect to a default or imminent 
default prior to three years after the end of the calendar year of such acquisition unless an 
opinion of counsel is furnished by the servicer to the trustee to the effect that the holding 
by the Trust Fund of such mortgage property subsequent to such 3-year period will not 
result in the imposition of taxes on Prohibited Transactions or cause the REMIC to fail to 
qualify as a REMIC at any time that any Certificates are outstanding or unless the 
servicer applied for, prior to the expiration of such three-year period, an extension of such 
3-year period in accordance with IRC §856(e)(3). In addition, the servicer is restricted 
from renting (or allowing to continue to be rented) any mortgage property acquired by 
foreclosure or otherwise using such property for the production of income in such a 
manner or pursuant to any terms that would (i) cause such property to fail to qualify as 
Foreclosure Property or (ii) subject the REMIC to the imposition of any federal, state or 
local income taxes on the income earned from such property unless the servicer agrees to 
indemnify the Trust Fund with respect to the imposition of any such taxes. In general, a 
breach by the servicer of any of the relevant REMIC provisions, as those stated above, 
that results in a loss of the REMIC‟s status or imposition of taxes on the REMIC would 
be the responsibility of the servicer, which can be a significant risk to a servicer 
depending on the severity of such breach and the results thereof. 
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Appendix A-2: Legal Definitions for Qualified Mortgages 
 
1. An “obligation” that is “principally secured by an interest in real property” and is either 
transferred to the REMIC on its startup day in exchange for regular or residual interests 
in the REMIC or is purchased by the REMIC within three months after the startup day 
“pursuant to a fixed-price contract in effect on the startup day.”  
 
2. A “participation or certificate of beneficial ownership” in such an obligation.   
 
3. A “qualified replacement mortgage,” which is an obligation, participation, or certificate 
of beneficial ownership that would be a qualified mortgage if received by the REMIC on 
the startup day in exchange for a regular or residual interest and is received for (1) 
another obligation within the three months after the startup day or (2) a “defective 
obligation” within two years after the startup day. 
 
4. A regular interest in another REMIC if the REMIC receives the interest on its startup day 
in exchange for a regular or residual interest in the REMIC.
 
 
 
5. A regular interest in a FASIT
74
 if (1) at least 95 percent of the FASIT's assets, by value, 
are at all times obligations, participations, and certificates that would be qualified 
mortgages if held by the REMIC and (2) the REMIC receives the interest on its startup 
day or purchases it within three months after the startup day pursuant to a contract in 
effect on that day.
 
 
 
6.A “credit enhancement contract” with respect to qualified mortgages held by a REMIC, 
such as a guarantee, is considered part of the mortgage, rather than a separate asset of the 
REMIC.
 
Similarly, a purchase agreement with respect to a convertible mortgage is 
allowable.  
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Appendix A-3: Significant Modifications
75
 
.06. With limited exceptions, a mortgage loan is not a qualified mortgage unless it is 
transferred to the REMIC on the startup day in exchange for regular or residual interests 
in the REMIC. 
.08. Section 1.1001-3(c)(1)(i) defines a “modification” of a debt instrument as any 
alteration, including any deletion or addition, in whole or in part, of a legal right or 
obligation of the issuer or holder of a debt instrument, whether the alteration is evidenced 
by an express agreement (oral or written), conduct of the parties, or otherwise. Section 
1.1001-3(e) governs which modifications of debt instruments are “significant.” Under § 
1.1001-3(b), for most federal income tax purposes, a significant modification produces a 
deemed exchange of the original debt instrument for a new debt instrument.  
.10. Certain loan modifications, however, are not significant for purposes of § 1.860G-
2(b)(1), even if the modifications are significant under the rules in § 1.1001-3. In 
particular, under § 1.860G-2(b)(3)(i), if a change in the terms of an obligation is 
“occasioned by default or a reasonably foreseeable default,” the change is not a 
significant modification for purposes of § 1.860G-2(b)(1), regardless of the 
modification's status under § 1.1001-3.  
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Appendix A-4: Specifically Prohibited Transactions and Penalties
76
 
 
1. The occurrence of any Prohibited Transaction and the realization of net income from 
Prohibited Transactions: Any net income generated from a Prohibited Transaction is 
subject to a 100% tax. A Prohibited Transaction can also cause the tax-free status of a 
REMIC to be lost or suspended. A Significantly Modified Obligation that is not a 
Qualified Replacement Mortgage will be considered a Prohibited Transaction and thus be 
subject to a 100% tax;  
 
2. The realization of net income from Foreclosure Property. Any net income realized from 
the operation of Foreclosure Property is subject to IRC §857(b)(4)(B) as if the REMIC 
were a real estate investment trust, which is then subject to tax at the highest corporate 
tax rate 
 
3. The making of unqualified contributions to a REMIC after the Startup Day:  Any 
contributions to a REMIC after its Startup Day is taxed at a rate of 100% unless they are 
made in cash and are related to: (i) a contribution made to facilitate a Cleanup Call, (ii) a 
payment in the nature of a guaranty, (iii) a contribution made during the three-month 
period beginning on the Startup Day, (iv) contribution made to a Qualified Reserve Fund 
by a Residual Interest holder in the REMIC or (v) a permitted contribution made under 
the treasury regulations 
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